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CORPORATIONS AND AUTONOMY THEORIES OF 
CONTRACT: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA 
NATHAN 0MANt 
ABSTRACT 
One of the central problems of contracts jurisprudence is the con-
flict between autonomy theories of contract and efficiency theories of 
contract. One approach to solving this conflict is to argue that in the 
realm of contracts between corporations, autonomy theories have noth-
ing to say because corporations are not real people with whose auton-
omy we need to be concerned. While apparently powerful, this argument 
ultimately fails because it implicitly assumes theories of the corporation 
at odds with economic theories of law. Economics, in turn, offers a vi-
sion of the firm that is quite hospitable to autonomy theories of contract. 
The failure of this argument suggests that a more fruitful avenue for rec-
onciling these competing approaches is to find a principled way of inte-
grating them into a single theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many contracts scholars have long had an intuition that corporations 
present a special problem for autonomy theories of contract law.1 Most 
of these theories implicitly or explicitly assume that contracting parties 
are human beings rather than institutions. Hence, there seems something 
suspect about applying such theories to corporations. Recently, scholars 
have tried to use this intuition to solve some basic problems in the phi-
losophy of contract law. In this paper, I hope to demonstrate that this 
approach will not work. First, I articulate the hitherto inchoate argu-
ments on which the intuition rests. Second, I demonstrate that despite 
their initial plausibility, these arguments are flawed. Ultimately, the in-
jection of corporations into contract law theory throws up new versions 
of some old problems, but corporations do not pose a unique or funda-
mental challenge to autonomy theories of contract. 
The most recent use of corporations in the debate over contract the-
ory comes at a time when that theory is deeply divided. Contracts schol-
arship suffers from an embarrassment of theoretical riches. 2 Philoso-
phers,3 historians,4 and economists5 have all entered the conversation. A 
few generations ago, discussion centered on questions of the extent to 
I. For example, in discussing form conlracls, Todd D. Rakoffhas written: 
Refusal to enforce a contract of adhesion, the courts say, trenches on freedom of conlract. 
Implicit in the argument is an equating of the drafting organization with a live individual. 
For what gives value to uncoerced choice - the type of freedom that the courts have in 
mind - is its connection to the human being, to his growth and development, his indi-
viduation, his fulfillment by doing .... To see a conlract of adhesion as the extension 
and fulfillment of the will of an individual entrepreneur, entitled to do business as he sees 
fit, is incongruous. 
Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1236 
(1983). See also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY 
FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 61 (1986) (arguing that corporations do not have "original auton-
omy righls"); Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract?- An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 
733 n.63 (1931) (noting the "pernicious heritage" in contract law scholarship of treating organiza-
tions as though they were people); Daniel Markovils, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 
1417, 1464-71 (2004) (arguing that his promissory theory ofconlract cannot be applied to contracts 
between corporations). 
2. See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (discuss-
ing contemporary theories of conlract law); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004) (same); 
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993) (same). 
3. See, e.g., THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed., 2001). 
4. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE (1991); DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 
(1999). 
5. See, e.g., THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) 
(collecting essays on conlract from an economic perspective). 
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which contracts reflected the will of the parties or the rules of societl 
and the relative merits of achieving fairness or freedom. 7 The debates 
had the advantage of occurring in essentially the same language.8 In 
contrast, the contracts theorists of today find that it is difficult to talk 
with each other even when discussing the same issues that exercised their 
predecessors. While each approach operates with its own criteria for 
successful theories, contracts scholars have not found a powerful and 
widely accepted meta-theory that would allow them to adjudicate be-
tween the competing approaches. The search for such a meta-theory is 
one of the major tasks of contemporary contracts scholarship. 
One of the difficulties confronting a contracts theorist is the sprawl-
ing nature of contract law itself. Contracts have the potential to govern 
everything from the sale of a cow by an individual farmer to disputes 
over the acquisition of a multi-billion dollar oil company.9 One strategy 
for dealing with the theoretical pluralism is to narrow the field of inquiry 
to purely commercial transactions. 10 The claim is that whatever its limi-
tations elsewhere, in the realm of firm-to-firm contracts, economic 
analysis should reign supreme. 11 Thus, even if a unified theory of all 
contracts is difficult, a unified theory of some significant subset of con-
tracts may be possible. 
The success of this latest move-which I shall call the new lex mer-
catoria (law merchant}-rests on its ability to dismiss outright 
non-economic theories as inapplicable. The claim is that autonomy theo-
ries are not useful in understanding contracts by corporations because 
such theories assume that contracting parties are human beings. Ulti-
mately, this argument necessarily invokes a particular theory-or set of 
theories-about the nature of corporations. These theories, however, 
have been largely repudiated by contemporary economic analysis. Ironi-
cally, contemporary law and economics explicitly assumes a model of 
the corporation that is particularly hospitable to the very theories that the 
proponents of the new lex mercatoria hope to dismiss once and for all. 
6. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933). 
7. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion- Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1942). 
8. For an idiosyncratic but influential account of this earlier discussion see Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (arguing that the 
discussion of contract law represented a competition between individualistic and altruistic visions of 
the law). 
9. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 920 (Mich. 1887) (discussing a contract to 
sell a cow named Rose); Texaco Inc. v. Penzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987) (discussing 
a contract to sell the Getty Oil Company). 
10. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. Kraus & 
Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contracts Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, ll3 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
ll. Schwartz & Scott, supra note l 0, at 544. 
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The failure to banish autonomy theories from the new lex mercato-
ria illustrates the difficulty of reconciling autonomy and welfare theories 
by dismissing one approach all together. Scholars interested in a coher-
ent theory of contracts would be better served by finding ways of inte-
grating the two approaches in some principled fashion. 12 Hence, any 
advantage of the new lex mercatoria must lie in its ability to make the 
integration of autonomy and welfare theories into a single approach more 
tractable. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some theoretical 
background on the conflict between autonomy and efficiency theories of 
contract and the attempts to reconcile them. In Part II, I provide a fully 
developed version of the argument for dismissing autonomy theories 
from the discussion of contracts between corporations. Part III examines 
the various theories of the corporation inherent in that argument. In Part 
IV, I argue that these theories of the corporation are inconsistent with 
efficiency theories of contract and that the preferred conception of the 
corporation among law and economics scholars-the nexus of contracts 
theory--can be reconciled with autonomy theories. In Part V, I illustrate 
the application of the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation to 
autonomy-based arguments about contracts between corporations using 
the example of contract interpretation. This article concludes with some 
observations on attempts to reconcile autonomy and efficiency drawn 
from the arguments over corporations and contracts. 
I. THE PREDICAMENT OF CONTEMPORARY CONTRACT THEORY AND THE 
NEW LEX MERCATORIA 
A. Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency 
Contemporary legal philosophy is essentially divided about the ba-
sis of contractual obligation. On one side are autonomy theorists who 
claim that contracts represent a form of self-determination and ought to 
be enforced as a way of respecting and increasing human freedom. On 
the other side are efficiency theorists who argue that voluntary transac-
tions increase aggregate levels of social welfare and ought to be enforced 
as a way of increasing wealth and utility. 13 The autonomy theories are 
12. For my own attempt to offer such an approach see Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in 
Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1483 (2005). 
13. There are of course theorists who seek to avoid this conflict by adopting a largely contex-
tual, atheoretical, and ad hoc approach to contract law. These theorists deny that contract law can or 
should be understood to embody a consistent theory. It is enough that it provides pragmatic solu-
tions to the concrete problems that it finds itself faced with. See also Robert Hillman, The Crisis in 
Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103 (1988) (arguing that a pragmatic model of contract 
law displays the complexity of the theory). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 2. For example, 
Jean Braucher has written, "I remain a skeptic about the need for and the wisdom of a unified field 
theory of contract, particularly a one-dimensional one; a good gray compromise statement of com-
peting concerns will probably do." Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regula-
tory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697,701 n.l4 (1990). For a discussion of the 
conflict between theory and pragmatism in contract law scholarship see Oman, supra note 12, at 
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deontological, while the efficiency theories are consequentialist, and 
therein lies the problem. As one philosopher has observed: 
As normative theories, economic contract theories would seem to be 
logically incompatible with autonomy contract theories for the same 
reason that consequentialist moral theories are logically incompatible 
with deontological moral theories: The former claim that moral justi-
fication is solely a function of consequences, while the latter claim 
that moral justification is logically independent of consequences. 14 
Without some way of reconciling or adjudicating between these compet-
ing approaches, contract theory is deeply incoherent. So long as the 
theories converge on the same conclusions, this is a logical but not a 
practical problem. However, when the theories diverge15 or when one 
theory fails to generate any concrete answers to particular questions, 16 
the absence of a unified approach presents real problems. 17 We are un-
able to specify or confidently justify the rules of contract law. 18 
There are two potential strategies for reconciling these differing 
theories of contract law. The first approach is the "horizontal independ-
1483-84. In addition, James Gordley and others have argued for a neo-scholastic vision of contract 
based on the idea of equality in exchange. James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547 
(1995). See also James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (2002). 
14. Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical 
Integration Strategy, in SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 420, 420 (Ernest Sosa & 
Enrique Villanueva eds. 200 I). 
15. Compare, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130-32 (4th ed. 1992) 
(arguing against specific performance on economic grounds), with Randy Barnett, Contract Reme-
dies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986) (arguing in favor of a default rule of 
specific performance based on an autonomy theory of contract). See generally TREBILCOCK, supra 
note 2, at 242 ("On the various central normative issues pertaining to the concept of freedom of 
contract, I have concluded that the claim of convergence between autonomy and welfare values is 
much more tenuous than proponents of the private ordering paradigm have conventionally been 
prepared to acknowledge."). 
16. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 
MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989) (arguing that autonomy theories produce no determinate answer to the 
question of what sorts of default rules the law of contract should include). 
17. Peter Benson has observed: 
Contemporary scholars often assume that the juxtaposition of a plurality of different 
moral conceptions in an account of law is unproblematic. Indeed, they frequently judge it 
to be desirable, because they think that the deployment of a multiplicity of conceptions 
enables a theory to accommodate the richness and the complexity of the subject matter 
under investigation. If, however, the invocation of different moral conceptions is to pro-
vide a coherent and stable account of the basis of contract, it is essential that these diverse 
conceptions function as integrated parts of an articulated and therefore intelligible whole. 
Otherwise, the plurality of conceptions will constitute only an unresolved chaos which 
cannot explain anything, whether simple or complex. 
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel 
and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1085-86 (1989). 
18. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 
118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at present no generally 
accepted theory or even family of theories of contract."); cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note I 0, at 543 
("Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a complete 
normative theory, explaining what the law should be."). 
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ence" strategy. 19 We can claim that autonomy approaches and efficiency 
approaches are actually theories about different things. Since both pur-
port to be theories of contract law, this claim is puzzling. There are, 
however, several different sorts of legal theories. A theory could justify 
legal rules20 or provide an explanation of a field of law.21 Alternatively, 
a theory could aim simply at predicting actual case outcomes.22 For ex-
ample, Jody Kraus claims that autonomy theories seek to explain the 
doctrinal arguments of judges.23 In contrast, he argues, efficiency theo-
ries seek to explain the outcomes of particular cases irrespective of the 
stated reasons of the judges.24 Hence the different theories are in fact 
explaining different things. 
The second approach is the "vertical integration" strategy.25 This 
strategy "contemplate[ s] . . . that both approaches may be combined as 
logically distinct components of a unified theory."26 They are reconciled 
by arranging the two approaches hierarchically. There are two ways that 
this can be done. First, one can show that autonomy is lexically superior 
to efficiency or vice versa, so that the normative criteria are logically 
distinct but one of them "trumps" the other. For example, I have argued 
elsewhere that one should pursue efficiency so long as it does not con-
flict with autonomy.27 When such conflicts arise, the demands of effi-
ciency must give way to the demands of autonomy.28 Alternatively, 
19. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation 
of Autonomy and Efficiency, I Soc. POL. & L. PHIL. 385, 390--422 (2002) ("Part II: Horizontal 
Independence"). I borrow the terminology "horizontal independence" and "vertical integration" in 
this section from Kraus. See also Kraus, Reconciling Efficiency and Autonomy, supra note 14. 
20. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law, supra note 19, at 400-02. 
21. !d. at 395-99. For the most elaborate attempt to date to provide such an internal interpre-
tation of contract law, see generally SMITII, supra note 2. 
22. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law, supra note 19, at 400. By prediction, Kraus 
seems to mean something like a theory that generates accurate forecasts of case outcomes without 
necessarily providing a phenomenologically accurate account of legal reasoning or legal justifica-
tions. There are obvious parallels between this conception of explanation and Milton Friedman's 
defense of unrealistic assumptions in economics. According to Friedman, the inaccuracy of the 
assumptions is irrelevant so long as the predictions were empirically correct. See Ernest Nagel, 
Assumptions in Economic Theory, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION 130, 130-38 (Alan 
Ryan ed., 1973) (discussing Friedman's argument that unrealistic assumptions are valid in economic 
theories if they produce accurate predictions). See generally ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY 
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 74--79 (1988) (discussing instrumentalism in economics). Analogously, Kraus 
envisions theories that provide inaccurate descriptions of legal doctrine but correctly predict who 
wins or loses the case. 
23. See Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
URISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689-90 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
24. !d. 
25. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 422. 
26. ld. 
27. Oman, supra note 14, at 1499. 
28. !d. at 1499-1506 (arguing for the lexical priority of liberty in contract law). Kraus sug-
gests that under a lexical ordering of competing theories the lexically prior theory can be thought of 
as authorizing but not requiring the lexically subordinate theory. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 420-
22. As an example of this approach, he cites Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE 
THEORY OF CONTRACf LAW 86 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). See id. at 437 n.6. 
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Louis Kaplow and Steven Shaven take the opposite position, claiming 
that "parties need to be induced to perform their contracts when perform-
ance would be beneficial, but should not be encouraged to perform when 
doing so would reduce their well-being."29 The second "vertical integra-
tion" strategy is to argue that one approach is foundational while the 
other is derivative. For example, Frank Buckley has argued that auton-
omy theories can actually be reduced to consequentialist theories. 30 Ac-
cording to Buckley, autonomy theories necessarily invoke the convention 
of promising. 31 Yet the desirability of the convention must be based on 
consequentialist reasoning, because we cannot invoke a promise to abide 
by the convention of promising without falling into circularity.32 Hence, 
autonomy is really an implication of consequentialism. As we shall see 
shortly, one can also argue that efficiency is an implication of autonomy. 
B. The New Lex Mercatoria 
Recently, some commercial law scholars have sought to reconcile 
the conflict by narrowing their focus from contracts in general to purely 
commercial transactions. The idea that the law should make a distinction 
between business obligations and other obligations has a long history. 
Roman law created a special class of "innominate contracts" that allowed 
certain kinds of business transactions, such as sales (emptio venditio) and 
partnerships (societas), to be concluded without the formalities required 
for other contracts.33 During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
long-distance trade began to reemerge in western Europe, and with it 
came the rise of the lex mercatoria to govern issues of sale, carriage, and 
insurance.34 Nineteenth-century jurists sought to unite all voluntary ob-
ligations under a single rubric of contract, 35 but today the law still makes 
subtle and not-so-subtle distinctions between business contracts and 
other contracts. In the United States, the entire law of sales has been cut 
off from the common law and codified in Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The U.C.C. also has a set of special rules that apply 
29. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 156 (2002). See also 
Richard Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L. REv. 979, 980-81 (2002) 
(discussing Kaplow and Shavell's Fairness Versus Welfare). 
30. F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (F.H. 
Buckley, ed. 1999). 
31. !d. at 4-5. 
32. See id. at 5-6. Buckley's assertion that all autonomy theories of contract- what he calls 
"right to contract" theories - can be dismissed by this kind of argument is a bit premature, since 
there are autonomy theories of contract that do not invoke the convention of promising. Buckley's 
failure to address non-promissory autonomy theories of contract is odd given the fact that Randy 
Barnett had offered a more or less fully articulated version of such a theory long before Buckley's 
essay appeared. See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986). 
33. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 171, 185 (1962). 
34. See HAROLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 333-34 (1983). 
35. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). Gilmore's thesis has 
been famously controversial on many fronts, not the least of which are his historical claims. See 
James Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 452 (1975) (attacking some of Gilmore's more 
extreme historical claims about the innovations of nineteenth-century theorists). 
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only "between merchants."36 According to some commercial law schol-
ars, the idea of a lex mercatoria can be used to attack the predicament of 
contemporary contract theory. 
Daniel Farber, for example, has implicitly built on this idea to offer 
a vertical integration strategy, arguing that in the context of commercial 
law an efficiency norm can be derived from a commitment to auton-
omy.37 He invokes John Rawls's argument that the principles of justice 
can be derived from what the parties in a hypothetical original position 
would choose behind a veil of ignorance that keeps them from knowing 
how they will personally fare under any particular set of principles.38 
According to Farber, in the original position the parties would choose a 
norm under which judges decided commercial law cases using effi-
ciency?9 Unlike earlier, more ambitious-and less persuasive--consent 
arguments for efficiency, Farber limits his defense to the realm of com-
mercial law.40 In this limited context, he argues that risk aversion, dis-
tributive justice, and catastrophic reallocations of wealth are of limited 
concern and are thus unlikely to upset consensus in the original posi-
tion.41 
Farber's argument seems to demonstrate that the task of reconciling 
competing approaches to contract law becomes more tractable when the 
discussion is narrowed to the context of commercial law. This turn to-
ward a new lex mercatoria can also be used to construct arguments 
showing that autonomy and efficiency are "horizontally independent." 
This approach offers a more radical solution to the problem of reconcil-
ing the competing approaches by suggesting that rather than being mis-
taken or derivative, autonomy theories are simply irrelevant for the vast 
majority of contracts. 
36. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-104(3) (defining "between merchants"); 2-201(2) (relaxing slightly 
the requirements of the statute of frauds between merchants); 2-207(2) (stating that additional terms 
accompanying an acceptance become part of the contract between merchants); 2-209(2) (stating that 
limitations on oral alterations of written contracts between merchants must be countersigned if the 
writing is a form); 2-605(1 )(b) (specifYing special repudiation rules for contracts between mer-
chants); 2-609(2) (stating that the reasonableness of the grounds for insecurity in contracts between 
merchants is determined by commercial practice). 
37. Farber, supra note 10, at 55-57. 
38. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-30 (rev. ed. 1999) (setting forth the basic argu-
ment for "justice as fairness" based on the original position). 
39. Farber, supra note 10, at 56-57. 
40. !d. Compare RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92-115 (1981) (offering a 
consent based justification for the "wealth maximization" norm) with JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, 
MORALS, AND THE LAW 115-22 (1988) (criticizing Posner's argument) and RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237, 251-66 (1985) (offering a slightly different critique of Posner's argu-
ment). Posner himself has largely conceded defeat in this debate. See RICHARD POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMA TICS OF LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY (1999). 
41. Farber, supra note I 0, at 73. He also argues that the efficiency norm should only be 
pursued in commercial law when the lexically prior demands of justice generated by Rawls' theory 
are satisfied. !d. at 7 4-7 5. 
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II. THE ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY ARGUMENT 
A. Horizontal Independence and the New Lex Mercatoria 
In a recent article, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott offer a "horizon-
tal independence" approach to the conflict between autonomy and effi-
ciency by combining the idea of the lex mercatoria and economics to 
offer a new theory of contract law.42 Their core claim is that contract law 
should pursue no other goal than to maximize the joint gains from trans-
actions.43 All other considerations should be ignored.44 The hope that 
economics can provide a master norm for contracts is not new.45 Indeed, 
law and economics has had other approaches "on the run" for at least 
fifteen years, if not longer.46 What is new is the basic strategy that 
Schwartz and Scott adopt. Following Farber, they seek to strengthen the 
case for the primacy of economic analysis by limiting it. Thus, they 
claim their theory applies only to contracts between firms.47 In so doing 
they explicitly hark back to the lex mercatoria.48 
Limiting the theory to inter-firm contracts provides a unified theory 
of contract law by summarily dismissing autonomy theories.49 Because 
42. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10. Much of the rest of this paper focuses on the claim put 
forward by Schwartz and Scott that autonomy theories of the corporation are inapplicable to con-
tracts between corporations, and the arguments implicit in that claim. In fairness to them, and their 
fine article, I hasten to point out that the bulk of their piece is not directed at the issue of theoretical 
pluralism, but rather at working out the implications of a single-minded allegiance to the efficiency 
norm. Because my primary interest here is the issue of theoretical pluralism, rather than the specific 
elaborations of autonomy and efficiency theories, I focus mainly on those parts of their article that 
address the issue of pluralism. I am in no way claiming that that this piece is a response to the subtle 
economic arguments that make up the bulk of their article. 
43. !d. at 544. 
44. See id. 
45. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 30, at 2 ("Not merely does law-and-economics scholarship 
offer a compelling normative explanation for free contracting, but rival theories are unpersuasive."). 
See also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 29, at 52-58 (arguing that welfare based theories of 
contract are superior to alternatives based on promising or personal autonomy). 
46. See Kraus, supra note 23, at 687 ("As in private law scholarship generally, economic 
analysis is the dominant paradigm in contemporary contracts scholarship."). Although, dating such 
things is always subjective, I would point to Richard Craswell' s article attacking the inability of 
autonomy theories to account for the default rules of contract law as the decisive turning point in 
favor of economic analysis. See Craswell, supra note 16. 
47. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 544. They do not foreclose the possibility, however, 
that it may apply to other contracts as well. !d. For purpose of their theory, Schwartz and Scott 
define a firm as: "(I)[ A ]n entity that is organized in corporate form and that has five or more em-
ployees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting 
firm." !d. at 545. 
48. They write, "[F]or centuries [commercial law] has drawn a distinction between mercantile 
contracts and others. Modem scholars have not systematically pursued the normative implications 
of this ancient distinction, however. We attempt to cure this neglect by setting out the theoretical 
foundations of a law merchant for our time." !d. at 550 (citation omitted). 
49. Limiting the theory to contracts between firms also makes the positive economic analysis 
of contracting relationships more tractable. Many non-economists doubt that the rational actor 
model of modem law and economics can provide an adequate epistemological framework for legal 
theory. Behavioralists object to simple theories of utility maximization, pointing to evidence of 
systematic cognitive biases that seem to falsify the basic assumptions of the rational actor model. 
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 {1998); and Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endow-
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all of the agents in this realm are corporations, autonomy theories based 
on a commitment to individual freedom are inapplicable. 50 "These an-
swers are ruled out . . . because business firms that make commercial 
contracts are artificial persons whose autonomy the state need not respect 
on moral grounds, and whose morality is ordinarily required by positive 
law."51 If this move is justified, then Schwartz and Scott may have found 
the holy grail of contemporary contracts scholarship: A unified theory of 
contract law. As they point out, most interpersonal agreements and 
firm-to-person agreements are not governed by the law of contracts.52 
While human beings may make contracts, most of their voluntary rela-
tions are governed by employment law, real estate law, family law, or 
consumer protection law. 53 Thus, even if a theory of firm-to-firm con-
tracts is not a complete account of contract law, it would cover the lion's 
share of contracts in the real world. 
B. Autonomy Theories and the Corporation 
Unfortunately, Schwartz and Scott do not provide any more details 
about why the artificial nature of the corporate person vitiates autonomy 
theories of firm-to-firm contracts. In the remainder of this section, I will 
flesh out this argument, explicitly articulating the case for banishing 
autonomy theories from the discussion of the new lex mercatoria. I shall 
call this line of reasoning the Artificial Personality Argument. Because 
they refer to this argument rather than explicitly developing it, what fol-
lows is not exposition but original analysis. Nevertheless, the Artificial 
Personality Argument lies at the bottom of the common intuition that 
autonomy theories cannot apply to contracts by corporations. While I 
ultimately conclude that the Artificial Personality Argument is a failure, 
in laying it out I try to make the strongest case possible for it, and in the 
end I believe that it stands as a real challenge to autonomy theories rather 
than as a straw man that can easily be brushed aside. 
The Artificial Personality Argument is based on the philosophical 
assumptions of contemporary autonomy theories.54 The works of 
Charles Fried and Randy Barnett provide two of the more widely dis-
cussed examples of autonomy approaches and briefly sketching their 
ment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. I (2002). Because finns, 
however, are profit maximizing institutions rather than actual persons, one can argue that in the 
limited context of corporate behavior, the critiques of the rational actor model, whatever their force 
elsewhere, are quite weak. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 550-51. Schwartz and Scott ac-
knowledge that agency costs and cognitive biases may also distort firm behavior, causing them to 
deviate from the predictions of a pure rational actor model. However, they are optimistic that com-
petition and corporate mortality largely weed out these problems. See id at 551 & n.I8 (responding 
to behavioral law and economics literature on corporate behavior). 
50. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note I 0, at 556. 
51. Id 
52. /d. at 544. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 556 n.25. 
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theories will illuminate the Artificial Personality Argument.55 Both of 
these theorists justify and explain contract law by arguing that it repre-
sents a commitment to the value of individual liberty.56 According to 
Fried, the basis of contract is the enforcement of promises. 57 He goes on 
to argue that "[t]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in ar-
guments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust."58 
Individual autonomy, in turn, rests on what he calls the "liberal ideal."59 
According to Fried this is the principle that ''whatever we accomplish 
and however that accomplishment is judged, morality requires that we 
respect the person and property of others, leaving them free to make their 
lives as we are left free to make ours."6° Fried's "liberal principle" es-
sentially restates the traditional distinction between the right and the 
good. In liberal political philosophy, the right defines the sphere in 
which people are free to pursue their own ends free of coercion. The 
good represents the ideals and ends that people use their freedom to pur-
sue.61 According to Fried, promising provides us with a way of enlisting 
the help of others in the pursuit of our vision of the good without violat-
ing their rights.62 At the same time, breaking a promise violates the "lib-
eral principle," treating the disappointed promisee as a mere means to the 
promisor's ends.63 For Fried, contract law is simply the legal instantia-
tion of this set of moral principles. 
Fried's theory is open to a number of objections. Its focus on the 
will of the promisor seems to commit it to subjective theories of contract 
formation and interpretation, both of which have been rejected by the 
common law and present practical problems.64 In addition, contract as 
promise commits the law to enforcing principles of personal morality, 
55. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(1981); Barnett, supra note 32. Other examples are summarized in Peter Benson, Contracts, in A 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
56. FRIED, supra note 55, at 2, and Barnett, supra note 32, at 306. 
57. FRIED, supra note 55, at 2-4. 
58. !d. at 16. 
59. !d. at 7. 
60. FRIED, supra note 55, at 7. 
61. "(L]iberals ... draw a distinction between the 'right' and the 'good'- between a frame-
work of basic rights and liberties, and the conceptions of the good that people may choose to pursue 
within the framework." Michael Sandel, Introduction to LmERALISM AND ITS CRITICS I, 3 (Michael 
Sandel, ed. 1984). For further discussions of the distinction, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE §§ 5-6, 48, 68, 84 (rev. ed. Oxford University Press 1999) and BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8-19 (1980). 
62. FRIED, supra note 55, at 8. 
63. See FRIED, supra note 55, at 16--17 ("By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and 
respect, it is wrong to invoke that convention in order to make a promise, and then break it."). 
64. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) ("You 
can't escape contractual obligation by signing with your fingers crossed behind your back, even if 
that clearly shows your intent not to be bound."), Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Sisters of Char-
ity, 331 A.2d 313, 316 (Md. 1975) ("When language of a contract is clear, the true test of what is 
meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the 
position of the parties would have thought it meant."). See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 118-127, 137-139, 148-152, 503-505 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the role of the objec-
tive theory in the contemporary law of contracts). 
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which apparently conflicts with the liberal principles that Fried in-
vokes. 65 In response, Barnett has proposed an autonomy theory based on 
the alienation of rights rather than the sanctity of promising.66 Barnett 
begins his argument by invoking a version of Fried's "liberal principle": 
The function of ... [a] theory based on individual rights is to define 
the boundaries within which individuals may live, act, and pursue 
happiness free of the forcible interference of others. 67 
Barnett dispenses with Fried's complex gyrations around promising 
and its autonomy-extending powers.68 Rather, he looks to how rights are 
acquired and transferred.69 While arguing that certain rights are inalien-
able,70 Barnett claims that most rights can be transferred by their holders 
to others. 71 Within the liberal framework, consent becomes the touch-
stone for the transfer of rights precisely because rights are meant to de-
fine the sphere within which an individual is entitled to live her life free 
of coercion.72 Contract law thus becomes the legal mechanism that fa-
cilitates and polices the consensual transfer of rights. Most contracts 
involve a commitment to some future action. This temporal aspect poses 
a potential embarrassment to Barnett's consent theory, which seems to 
reduce contracting to conveyancing. It is also part of what makes the 
promissory theory attractive. Promises are by definition commitments to 
some future action. A consent theory of contract, however, has the same 
advantage so long as one can conceptualize future performance as a kind 
of alienable present entitlement. 73 
65. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 69. Furthermore, Smith writes: 
The reason it is said to be illegitimate for the state to enforce promises qua promises is 
that doing so is inconsistent with the 'harm principle.' This foundational principle of 
modern liberalism ... holds that it is illegitimate for the state to interfere with an individ-
ual's liberty unless that individual has harmed ... another individual. 
!d.; Randy Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022, 1025 
( 1991) ("[A] moral theory of promising, standing alone, would have courts enforcing purely moral 
commitments, which is tantamount to legislating virtue."). Schwartz and Scott seem to be implicitly 
alluding to this point when they note that the morality of corporate behavior is already required by 
the non-contract law. Schwartz & Scott, supra note I 0, at 556. But see Thomas Scanlon, Promises 
and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw 86 (Peter Benson, ed. 200 I) (rejecting the argu-
ment that enforcing promises is an illegitimate exercise morality enforcement). 
66. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 271-74 (criticizing will theories of contract and promissory 
theories of contract). 
67. Barnett, supra note 32, at 291. 
68. See generally id. 
69. See generally id. 
70. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
CONTRACT LAW 70 (Randy E. Barnett, ed., 2d ed. 200 I). 
71. Barnett, supra note 32, at 293 ("The subjects of most rights transfer agreements are enti-
tlements that are indisputably alienable."). 
72. See id. at 296-300 (discussing consent as the moral basis for the transfer of rights). 
73. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 73 (1995). The 
possibility of conceptualizing promises of future action as transfer of a presently existing entitlement 
is perhaps the chief internal weakness of transfer theories like Barnett's. Stephen Smith has tren-
chantly summarized the argument, writing: 
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Despite their important differences, these theories are both 
grounded in the moral assumptions of liberal individualism. 74 Liberalism 
takes the individual human being as the basic unit of moral calculus, and 
then deduces moral theories from this basic assumption. 75 Both promise 
and consent theories see the autonomy of individuals as providing a 
normative justification for the law of contracts. With these individualis-
tic assumptions clearly in view, we can understand the nature of the Arti-
ficial Personality Argument and the dismissal of autonomy theories from 
the new lex mercatoria. 
According to the Artificial Personality Argument, applying auton-
omy theories to corporate contracts is a category mistake. In justifying 
respect for the autonomy of others, Immanuel Kant wrote: 
Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an 
end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by 
this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to him-
self or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time 
as an end.76 
Kant's formulation makes explicit that respect for autonomy is tied 
to the humanity of the rights-bearer. 77 Liberals do not respect the auton-
omy of rocks precisely because rocks are not human beings. According 
to the Artificial Personality Argument corporations are like rocks rather 
The conceptual objection to transfer theories is that it is not possible for contracting par-
ties to do what such theories suppose they are doing when they make a contract. More 
specifically, the objection is that the rights that transfer theories suppose are transferred 
by contracts do not exist prior to the making of contracts .... I have the right to give or 
not give you my watch next Thursday. But a contract in which I agree to deliver my 
watch to you next Thursday cannot be regarded as transferring that liberty right to you. 
SMITH, supra note 2, at 101. 
74. The link between autonomy-based arguments for freedom of contract and liberalism has, 
however, been questioned by some self-proclaimed liberal theorists. See, e.g., Dori Kimel, Neutral-
ity, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. OF L. STUD. 473 (2001) (arguing that the 
version of perfectionist liberalism articulated by Joseph Raz justifies significant restrictions on 
contractual freedom). See also DORI KiMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT (2003). Stephen Smith, 
for example, links what he calls "rights-based theories" (autonomy theories in this article) with 
liberal individualism, writing: 
Rights-based theories of contract typically understand rights in the traditional 'Kantian' 
sense. Rights, in this view, reflect the classically individualistic values .... [I]t is ex-
pressed in the idea that the foundation of rights is individualist. These foundations are 
typically regarded as either the protection of specifically individual interests (say an in-
terest in owning property or achieving personal autonomy), or, following Kant again, as 
flowing from a particular conception of human agency. It would be inappropriate, in this 
view, to explain our rights as grounded in, say, utilitarian considerations of general wel-
fare. 
SMITH, supra note 2, at 141. 
75. See, e.g., STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 14 
( 1992) ("The idea that society, and particularly its political arrangements, can be understood as ... a 
contract between individuals has been a major theme in the history of liberal thought."). 
76. IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James W. 
Ellington, trans. 1981) ( 1785). 
77. Jd. 
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than people. 78 Autonomy theories of contract cannot justify the contract 
law applying to corporations precisely because such theories are deeply 
grounded in respect for human beings as free definers of their own 
lives.79 Corporations are not human beings and are not entitled to be 
treated as ends rather than means. Morality does not require "leaving 
them free to make their lives as we are left free to make ours."80 To 
paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist, the claim of the Artificial Personal-
ity Argument is that autonomy theories are concerned with "the liberty of 
natural, not artificial persons."81 Seen in these terms, the Artificial Per-
sonality Argument is a "horizontal independence" strategy that purports 
to demonstrate that firm-to-firm contracts are a separate phenomenon 
about which autonomy theories have nothing to say. 
Once we explicitly state the Artificial Personality Argument, it be-
comes clear that it stands or falls based on one's theory of the corpora-
tion. If corporations really are fundamentally different than natural per-
sons, then concern for human autonomy tells us nothing about the law 
governing their contracts. On the other hand, if the distinction between 
natural persons and corporations can be collapsed, then autonomy theo-
ries can be used to understand firm-to-firm contract law and the basic 
problem of theoretical pluralism remains. If the Artificial Personality 
Argument fails, we must look elsewhere for a reconciliation. In the next 
section, I turn to theories of the corporation that could support the Artifi-
cial Personality Argument. 
III. ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION 
The Artificial Personality Argument rests on the assumption that 
corporations are not human beings. We must be wary of metaphors. It is 
easy to speak of "soulless corporations" or "impersonal" firms, but if one 
looks at the functioning of any corporation, what one sees are actual hu-
man beings. 82 Even shell corporations that exist only as file folders and 
tax shelters have their documents handled by digits attached to human 
hands. The Wall Street Journal regularly reports on the contracts that 
corporations have "signed" with one another, but it also mentions the 
human beings that actually put pen to paper.83 Thus, the Artificial Per-
sonality Argument cannot literally rely on the claim that corporate con-
tracts are not the acts of human beings. Rather, it must rest on some 
78. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556. 
79. Cf Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1173, 1236 (1983). 
80. Cf FRIED, supra note 55, at 7. 
81. Cf First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Northwestern National Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243,255 (1906)). 
82. Cf LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194 (2d ed. 1985). 
83. See, e.g., James Handler, Losing Focus: As Kodak Eyes Digital Future, A Big Partner 
Starts to Fade, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,2004 at AI (discussing contracts signed by Walgreens, Kodak, 
and Fuji), Healthcare Brief, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2004 at AIO (discussing contracts signed by 
RiteAid, Corp.). 
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concept of the corporation that explains why the activity of corporate 
agents signing contracts is morally different than the activity of two 
neighbors clinching a deal at a yard sale. The Artificial Personality Ar-
gument contends that autonomy theories of contract cannot apply to cor-
porate contracts because to do so would be nonsensical from the point of 
view of the autonomy theories themselves. Thus in order to make the 
Artificial Personality Argument coherent, we need some concept of the 
corporation that renders the human activity of the corporation unworthy 
of the kind of moral respect demanded by autonomy theories. 
There are three basic theories about the nature of corporations: the 
real theory, the concession theory, and the fiction theory. The real theory 
claims that corporations are the legal expression of organic groups or 
other supra-individual entities and should be understood as having a will 
and an existence that cannot be reduced to the sum of their collective 
parts. 84 The concession theory claims that the corporation is a creation of 
the state that exercises delegated authority to serve the purposes of the 
government, even when that purpose is "private" business.85 The fiction 
theory claims that the corporation is nothing more than a collection of 
individuals and that the language of corporations is little more than a 
useful shorthand referring to a complex set of individual rights and obli-
gations.86 None of these theories has ever completely dominated the law 
of corporations, and one can find traces of each theory in the reported 
cases. Hence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to match particular theo-
ries with different jurisdictions or different periods. Throughout history, 
they have existed side by side in the law, taking on different names and 
different nuances of meaning. 87 They have been combined and confused 
with one another in various ways, but the basic claims demonstrate a 
remarkable continuity. 
In the remainder of this section, I shall argue that the Artificial Per-
sonality Argument can employ both the real and the concession theory. 
In the next section, I will argue that the Artificial Personality Argument 
cannot use the fiction theory, and that such a theory can be employed by 
autonomy theories to understand the nature of corporate contracts. 
A. The Real Theory of Corporations 
Although the real theory of the corporation has almost disappeared 
from discussions of corporate law, at one time it was an important posi-
84. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1994). 
85. !d. at 1069. 
86. Jd at 1064. 
87. See id. at 1064-65. 
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tion in corporate jurisprudence.88 Writing at the end of the nineteenth 
century, Ernst Freund summarized the position, stating: 
Above the existence of the individual there is the existence of the 
species, and the corporation is nothing but the legal expression of this 
fact, which appears as a reality in the physical person, so the higher 
will of the species is embodied in numerous and various forms of as-
sociation, and as a result we find, beside the individual, entities of a 
higher order endowed with volition and acting capacity. And where 
the law recognizes such embodied will as a person, we have a juristic 
. 89 person or a corporatiOn. 
There are two key ideas in this theory. The first is that the legal form of 
the corporation recognizes an already existing community. One way in 
which this concept manifests itself legally is through the doctrine of 
"corporation by prescription."90 At common law, a community-such as 
a town-which operated as an entity for a long period of time could be-
come a legal person without a formal charter of incorporation.91 The 
second key idea is that corporate bodies are possessed of a collective will 
that cannot be reduced to the individual wills of the members of the cor-
poration. 
The real theory of the corporation received its most forceful state-
ment in German legal thought. Nineteenth-century German jurists were 
eager to find authentically German legal traditions in contrast to the for-
eign influences of the Roman law.92 Otto Gierke became the proponent 
of this approach in the context of corporate law.93 According to Gierke, 
the indigenous, pre-Roman German law had a thick notion of corporate 
existence, what Gierke called Genossenshaft.94 In contrast to the thin, 
88. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 67 
(200 I) ("For almost forty years after 1890 American jurists, like their German French, and English 
counterparts, were preoccupied with the theory oflegal personality."). 
89. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 13 (Chicago, The Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1897). 
90. One of the earliest recorded cases dealing with this doctrine was Lord Coke's opinion in 
The Case of Sutton's Hospital, where he wrote that if"before time of memory foundation was made 
... foundation is taken for incorporation." 10 Coke's Rep. 23a, 33a (Kings Bench, 1612) reprinted 
in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 347,372 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
91. See, e.g., Town of Juliaetta v. Smith, 85 P. 923, 924 (Idaho 1906) (municipal corporation 
may exist by prescription from long use even if the formalities of incorporation were not complied 
with); Worley v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493,496 (1882) ("The exercise of corporate powers over a place for 
twenty years, with knowledge on the part of the public, is conclusive evidence ... of a corporation 
by prescription."); Bassett v. Porter, 58 Mass. 487, 492-93 (1849) (stating that an entity of long 
standing may be presumed to have a legal existence even if no record of incorporation exists). As 
these cases - especially Bassett - show, corporations by prescription were frequently created by 
recourse to the legal fiction that a charter had been granted at some point in the past but inadver-
tently lost. 
92. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 320--25 (1992) (dis-
cussing the work of nineteenth-century German jurists of the so-called "Historical School"). 
93. See OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick William Mait-
land trans., 1900) (Beacon Press 1958). 
94. See id. at 37 ("It is a distinctive trait of medieval doctrine that within every human group 
it decisively recognizes an aboriginal and active Right of the group taken as a Whole."). 
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Roman theory that a corporation was nothing more than a legal fiction, 
Gierke argued that historically German law recognized the organic exis-
tence of the group. 95 Corporations, he argued, are the legal manifestation 
of communities possessed of a collective spirit.96 Hence, the acts of a 
corporation are not the mere aggregation of the individual acts of its 
members, but rather should be understood as being qualitatively differ-
ent. Gierke's treatise became influential in common law countries by 
virtue of a translation by Frederick Maitland.97 Maitland and others ar-
gued that in numerous instances the common law acknowledged the real 
existence of collectives and treated their actions as what they were-the 
choices of organic groups, even when the groups were not formally in-
corporated. They took this as evidence that in practice the common law, 
whatever the rhetoric of its judges and lawyers, contained elements of the 
real theory. 98 
The real theory of the corporation is largely forgotten today, but 
Meir Dan-Cohen has adopted a position very similar to it, albeit one 
shorn on Gierke's Hegelianism.99 Dan-Cohen presents his theory 
through a hypothetical. 100 Imagine a regular company with human man-
agers and employees who make widgets. 101 One day the managers de-
cide to mechanize the company's production completely. 102 All of the 
employees are fired. and replaced with widget-making machines. 103 This 
move to automation proves so productive that the shareholders vote to 
replace management with computers. 104 The computers then decide to 
alter the firm's capital structure, and the corporation purchases all of its 
outstanding shares of stock in a buy back, leaving a fully functioning 
corporation bereft of any human beings at all. 105 According to 
95. See id. 
96. !d. 
97. See HORWITZ, supra note 88, at 71-72 (discussing Maitland's influence on the debates 
over corporate theory). 
98. See Frederick William Maitland, Introduction to OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF 
THE MIDDLE AGES vii (Frederick William Maitland trans., 1900) (Beacon Press 1958); Frederick 
Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?, 27 L.Q. REV. 219 
( 1911 ). The sorts of acknowledgments of organic group life pointed out by Maitland continue to 
exist in American law. !d. Thus, American law routinely treats unincorporated associations as 
persons, implicitly acknowledging according to Maitland's argument, the "real" status of these 
groups. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8471(4) (2005) (defining "person" under the Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Management System to include "unincorporated association"); II U.S.C. § 101(9)(iv) 
(2005) (defining "corporation" under the bankruptcy laws to include an "unincorporated company or 
association"); 12 U.S.C. § 375b(9)(A)(i) (2005) (noting that an "association" or "unincorporated 
organization" can violate Federal Reserve Board regulations); 15 U.S.C. §17 (2005) (noting that 
"unincorporated associations" can be sued by major league baseball players for anti-trust violations). 
99. See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL 
THEORY FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 47-51 (1986). 
I 00. !d. at 46. 
101. !d. 
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Dan-Cohen, "[t]he displacement of human management by computers 
would ... have little effect on both the actual operations and the legal 
status of [the corporation]."106 The only thing that makes the hypotheti-
cal implausible is the demands it places on computer technology not on 
legal theory. 107 The ease with which we can imagine fitting such a per-
sonless corporation into our existing laws suggests than corporations 
should be treated as sui generis. 
Regardless of whether one conceptualizes the real theory in the 
terms of Gierke or Dan-Cohen, it fits the needs of the Artificial Personal-
ity Argument. Gierke's Genossenshaft may be entitled to some kind of 
respect and autonomy, but such requirements cannot be specified using 
contemporary autonomy theories. The liberalism upon which the auton-
omy theories rely is essentially individualistic. To borrow the words of 
Gierke, in liberal thought there is "a drift, which makes for a theoretical 
concentration of right and power in the highest and widest group on the 
one hand and the individual man on the other, at the cost of all interme-
diate groups."108 Genossenshaft is thus outside the categories of liberal 
theory. Dan-Cohen, as a contemporary of Barnett and Fried, ts even 
more explicit: 
The negative answer to the question ... [of] whether or not organiza-
tions can have original autonomy rights of their own . . . follows 
simply and straightforwardly from combining the ethical individual-
ism of the paradigm of autonomy with our description of organiza-
tions [in the computerized company hypothetical]. 109 
Because corporations qua corporations can exist independent of any hu-
man members they cannot be endowed with rights based on notions of 
human dignity. It does not follow from this that corporations are entitled 
to no rights. Such rights, however, including presumably the right to 
contract, 110 must be based on some sort of consequentialism. 111 
I 06. !d. at 48. 
107. See id. Indeed, Dan-Cohen does not even believe that his hypothetical places unrealistic 
demands on computer technology. !d. 
108. GIERKE, supra note 93, at 87. 
109. DAN-COHEN, supra note 99, at 61. 
110. See id. at 98-102 (discussing contract remedies within the context of Dan-Cohen's the-
ory). 
111. !d. at 80 ("[I]t is clear that as far as derivative rights are concerned the utilitarian is indif-
ferent whether the right bearing unit is an individual human being or a Personless Corporation."). 
Not surprisingly, Dan-Cohen's version of the "real theory" is particularly hospitable to the Artificial 
Personality Argument when it is employed by economic partisans like Schwartz and Scott. !d. 
Indeed, he anticipates the basic approach of Schwartz and Scott, if not the details of their particular 
economic arguments. !d. He mirrors the individual-individual, individual-organization, organiza-
tion-organization typology presented by Schwartz and Scott, and like them argues that in organiza-
tion-organization transactions in particular considerations of utility should dominate. See id. at 191. 
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B. The Concession Theory of Corporations 
In contrast to the marginal place of the real theory in Eng-
lish-speaking jurisprudence, 112 the concession theory flows naturally 
from the history of Anglo-American corporate law and is a prominent 
feature of much of the doctrinal discussion of that law. 113 Stated suc-
cinctly, it claims that corporations are institutions that exercise authority 
delegated to them by the state. 114 
Some of the very first business corporations were the royal charter 
companies of Elizabethan England.115 These corporations were created 
by a special charter from the crown that gave them not only corporate 
existence but also a monopoly over some aspect of commerce. 116 The 
Royal East India Company neatly illustrates the state-like functions of 
these companies. 117 This corporation was responsible for the entire Eng-
lish conquest of the Indian subcontinent. 118 At the zenith of its power it 
ruled the entire country and administered a "private" army of 260,000 
troops, more than twice the size of the British Army of the time. 119 In-
deed, India--or some portion of it-was formally ruled by the East India 
Company for over a century until 1858, when it turned the government 
of the subcontinent over to the Crown. 120 
Although less dramatic, the early history of America also illustrates 
the quasi-public status of early corporations. The earliest corporations 
operating in America were some of the colonies themselves. For exam-
ple, both Massachusetts and Virginia were self-governing corporations 
created by the grant of a charter. 121 During the colonial period, there 
were only a tiny handful of business corporations created by the colonial 
legislatures, 122 and municipal corporations were only slightly more 
112. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1490-91 (1989) (describing the short life of the "real theory" 
in American jurisprudence). 
113. /d. 
114. /d. ("Like government authorities, managers exercise their power by means of a rational-
ized system of control and administration like the government, the 'public' firm was a 'political' 
entity."). 
115. See generally W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 
31 YALE L.J. 382 (1921) (discussing corporations law during the Elizabethan period). 
116. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY 
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 21 (2003). 
117. But see Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal Between Entre-
preneurs and Outside Investors, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567941 (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2005) (offering a contractual account of the formation of the East India company). 
118. /d. 
119. /d. 
120. Jd. at 28. 
121. I WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 2 n.3 (1999 & Supp. 2005) (noting that Virginia was incorporated in 1606 and 
Massachusetts in 1629). 
122. Simeon Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REv. 449, 
450 (1903) (listing the six corporate charters granted by colonies for businesses before the Revolu-
tion). 
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common.
123 With independence, however, states began granting more 
corporate charters, but they did so mainly to further quasi-public goals 
such as the construction of bridges or canals and the charters frequently 
granted monopolies. 124 The bulk of businesses continued to operate as 
sole proprietorships, partnerships, or unincorporated joint-stock compa-
nies. 125 Although the first general incorporation statute was passed by 
North Carolina in 1795,126 most corporations continued to be formed by 
special acts of the legislature that gave to individual corporations specific 
powers and rights. 127 
Although there was agitation to open up the corporate form during 
the Jacksonian period,128 it wasn't until after the Civil War that the cor-
poration became the dominant form of business organization in Amer-
ica. 129 The change came with general incorporation statutes that issued 
charters to corporations for "any lawful purpose."130 Even those corpora-
tions, however, continued to be conceptualized as concessions from the 
state. For example, in his first inaugural address as governor of New 
Jersey, Woodrow Wilson reaffirmed that "[a] corporation exists, not of 
natural right, but only by license of law, and the law ... is responsible 
for what it creates."131 Today, the language of delegated power contin-
ues to pervade the legal language surrounding corporations. 132 For ex-
123. Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1096 (1980) ("Prior to 
the Revolution there were only about twenty incorporated cities in America."). 
124. FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 188-89. "[P]eople in 1800 identified corporations with 
franchise monopolies." /d. at 194. 
125. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 190 ("Until ... the middle of the [nineteenth] century, 
the corporation was by no means the dominant form of business organization."); Paul G. Mahoney, 
Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REv. 873, 886-90 
(2000) (chronicling the use of unincorporated joint-stock companies prior to the passage of general 
incorporation statutes). See also FLETCHER, supra note 121, § 2 ("[M]ost of the business of the 
period [early American history] being transacted by unincorporated joint stock companies more in 
the nature of limited partnerships."). 
126. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,295-96 (1998) 
("In 1795, North Carolina adopted perhaps the first incorporation statute in the United States, grant-
ing canal builders the right of eminent domain under certain conditions and the power to 'sue and be 
sued, plead and be impleaded, under the denomination of the canal company."'). 
127. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 188 ("In the early 19th century ... the legislature 
granted charters by statute, one by one."). In addition, Congress incorporated some businesses by 
special statutes, perhaps most notably in the nineteenth century, the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. See Act of July I, 1862, 37 Cong. Ch. 120, July I, 1862, 12 Stat. 489 (incorporating Union 
Pacific). 
128. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 194-95 (discussing Jacksonian agitation over corpora-
tions). 
129. /d. at 511 ("By 1870 corporations had a commanding position in the economy."). 
130. New York seems to have been the first state to adopt such a law in 1866. See 1866 N.Y. 
Laws 1896. 
131. Quoted in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 n.37 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
132. See, e.g., Allen v. Malvern Country Club, 746 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Ark. 1988) ("Corpora-
tions organized under the laws of this state are but creatures of the legislature"); Sahara Grotto & 
Styx, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 261 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that 
corporations possess powers delegated to them by the statutes of their incorporation). The extent to 
which this delegation language continues to have meaning in an age of general incorporation statutes 
is illustrated by the fact that seemingly core aspects of government can be delegated to private cor-
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ample, the Supreme Court has argued that corporations are creations of 
the state designed to confer special benefits on shareholders: 
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited li-
ability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation 
and distribution of assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital 
and to deploy their resources in ways that maximizing the return on 
their shareholders' investments. 133 
For liberal theory, the freedom of individuals is taken as a prima fa-
cie good, while the freedom of the state is viewed with great suspicion.134 
This suspicion is such that a libertarian theorist like Robert Nozick can 
claim, "The fundamental question of political philosophy, one that pre-
cedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there 
should be any state at all."135 One can think of social contract theories 
and other liberal justifications for the state as secular theodicies in which 
the primal evil of social coercion must be justified.136 Such coercion is 
the antithesis of individual autonomy and something requiring special 
explanation.137 As I have already noted, autonomy theories of contract 
rest implicitly or explicitly on some version of the liberal distinction be-
tween the right and the good. Individuals have rights, including the right 
to contract, so that they can pursue their own visions of the good. 138 In 
contrast, the state is not supposed to pursue a particular vision of the 
good. 139 Rather, respect for individuals requires that the state remain 
neutral as to their particular ideals, confining itself to the protection of 
their rights, or pursuit of a limited conception of the good constrained by 
the superior demands of individual rights. 140 
porations. See Owens v. Tri-County Turkey Creek ConseJVancy Dist. No. 21, 418 P.2d 674, 678 
(Okla. 1966) (taxing power); Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Kueckelhan, 425 P.2d 669, 679 (Wash. 1967) 
(law enforcement); Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. JaJVis, 926 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App. 1996) 
(eminent domain). 
133. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,658-59 (1990). 
134. ROBERTNOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA ix (1974). 
135. !d. at 4. 
136. Cf JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST Bk. l. II. 23-26 (1667), available at 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-rbearnost/pll.htrnl ("what is low raise and support; [t]hat to the highth 
of this great [a]rgument I may assert Eternal Providence, andjustifie the wayes of God to men"). 
137. For a modem, and in some ways extreme, approach to the problem of justifying the "evil" 
of collective coercion see NOZICK, supra note 134, at chs. 5-6 (presenting arguments in favor of a 
state monopoly on most forms of protective violence). 
138. See Joyce E. Taber, An Unanswered Question About Mandatory Arbitration: Should a 
Mandatory Arbitration Clause Preclude The EEOC From Seeking Monetary Relief On An Em-
ployee's Behalf In a Title VII Case?, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 281,291 n.58 (2000). 
139. Michael Mello, Adhering To Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall And The Dissent 
Towards Death As a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 592, 683 n.624 (1995). 
140. It should be noted that while the language of "rights" has a minimalist and libertarian 
flavor to it some left-of-center theorists find off-putting. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 706 
(referring to liberal theory's obsession with "dreaded 'crossings' of our 'boundaries"'). There are 
liberal theories that justify a fairly expansive vision of wealth redistribution and the provision of 
social seJVices by the government. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 38, at 266 (arguing that social 
inequalities should be arranged so as to benefit those who are least well oft). 
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We can now see why the concession theory of the corporation meets 
the conceptual needs of the Artificial Personality Argument. If a corpo-
ration is an institution that exercises power delegated to it by the state, 
then it does not make sense to justify the law governing its contracts with 
the same theories that justify the contracts of individuals. On this view, 
the actual human beings who sign the corporation's contracts and carry 
out its affairs are analogous to government bureaucrats. They are human 
beings, but their official actions are of a fundamentally different nature-
from the point of view of liberal political theory-from those engaged in 
by private individuals. "Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted 
or withheld is always a matter of state policy[,]"141 Justice Brandeis 
wrote. "If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end 
which the state deems desirable."142 Under the concession theory it is 
this link between corporations and the desires of the state that makes 
autonomy theories inapplicable to firm-to-firm contracts. 
IV. THE FICTION THEORY, THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS, AND 
AUTONOMY 
One of the striking things about the theories sketched in the preced-
ing section is how foreign they seem to most of contemporary corporate 
law scholarship. For example, one scholar contends, "It has been over a 
half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic 
stripe, took the concession theory seriously."143 While this is a bit of an 
exaggeration, 144 it is safe to say that neither the real nor the concession 
theory represents a dominant approach in law and economics scholar-
ship. Rather the dominant approach has been a modem version of the 
ancient fiction theory of the corporation. 145 Building on an individualis-
tic framework for understanding legal entities that goes back at least to 
the eleventh century, if not earlier, modem economists have conceptual-
ized the corporation as a "nexus of contracts."146 As I shall argue, this 
concept of the firm cannot be used by the Artificial Personality Argu-
ment and is actually quite consistent with autonomy theories of contract. 
A. The Fiction Theory of Corporations 
The fiction theory of the corporation is one the oldest approaches to 
corporate jurisprudence. It asserts that corporations are nothing more 
141. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 545 (Brandeis, J, dissenting). 
142. /d. 
143. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 141 (2002). 
144. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 151 (8th ed. 2000) ("[C]orporate law is constitutional law; that is, its dominant 
function is to regulate the manner in which the corporate institution is constituted, to define the 
relative rights and duties of those participating in the institution, and to delimit the powers of the 
institution vis-a-vis the external world."). 
145. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 143, at 199 ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal 
scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory."). 
146. See Michael J. Phillips, supra note 84, at 1071-72. 
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than useful conceptual devices for understanding the relationships be-
tween individuals. 147 Under Roman law, the dominant form of business 
organization, the societas, was conceptualized as a contract and lacked 
most of the incidents of"corporateness."148 During the eleventh century, 
the jurisprudence of corporations took on a new urgency as the Catholic 
Church came to be conceptualized legally as a set of interlocking corpo-
rations.149 The medieval canonists, in turn, drew on the nominalist strand 
of scholastic thought to define the corporation. As one four-
teenth-century jurist succinctly summarized the prevailing orthodoxy, 
"All philosophers and canonists [believe] that the whole does not differ 
really ... from its parts."150 The medieval formulation of corporations as 
"artificial persons" was to exert a powerful influence on corporate the-
ory, and centuries later the Supreme Court would use the same label. 151 
The medieval period also saw the rise of contractually created busi-
ness organizations that served many of the same functions as modern 
business corporations. One of the primary functions of legal personality 
and limited liability is what economists call "asset partitioning." For 
example: 
Consider a business (ignoring the organizational form) with a few 
owners. The owners will have personal creditors and the business 
will have business creditors. Each class of creditors needs to know 
which assets are available to satisfy which debts. Can the personal 
creditors seize business assets such as machines and inventory if the 
owner's personal debts are unpaid? Can the business creditors seize 
an owner's house or car if the business's debts are unpaid? It is criti-
cally important to a well-functioning system of organizational law 
that the answers to these two questions be clear, and extremely useful 
that the law offer multiple organizational forms that provide a varied 
menu of answers to them. 152 
Medieval lawyers solved these problems through a variety of contractual 
mechanisms. Merchants could band together for a voyage, and purchase 
a ship using a so-called "bottomary loan" (essentially a maritime mort-
gage). The ship would then become solely liable for the venture's liabili-
ties. 153 Italian traders created a contractual entity for business pur-
poses-known as a commenda-that partitioned assets along similar 
147. See id. at 1064-65. 
148. NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 185 ("Since Roman law had no concept of a corporation, 
every joint commercial venture necessarily took the form of a societas .... "). 
149. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 215-20 (discussing the constitutional role of corporate law 
in the Papal Revolution of the eleventh century). 
150. !d. at 607-08 n.48 (quoting the jurist Bartolus). 
151. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coil. v. Woodworth, 17 U.S. 518, 605 (1819) (referring to 
corporations as "artificial persons"). 
152. Mahoney, supra note 125, at 876. 
153. See id. at 882-83 (discussing bottomary loans). 
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lines. 154 During the Elizabethan period there were numerous joint stock 
companies that lacked any formal charter. These companies were en-
tirely contractual and allowed investors to limit their liability to the ini-
tial investment and reap some pro rata share of the returns of the ven-
ture. 155 In the wake of the South Sea Bubble, parliament passed laws 
against unchartered joint stock companies, but such companies continued 
to operate despite the law until the middle of the nineteenth century.156 
Thus, even as the concession theory of the corporation was rising to the 
position of legal orthodoxy in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a 
commercial reality in which most of the indicia of corporateness were 
being created almost entirely by contract. 157 Less than a century later, 
this earlier contractual account of the business corporation would be re-
discovered by economists. 158 
B. The Nexus of Contracts Theory 
The modern nexus of contract theory of the corporation traces its 
origin to a 193 7 article by Ronald Coase. 159 Coase was interested in un-
derstanding how the existence of the firm could be reconciled with what 
he called "the main achievement of economic science,"160 namely the 
insight that when resources are allocated using the decentralized process 
of the market what results is not chaos but an orderly movement of goods 
and services according to the price mechanism. If decentralized market 
processes could effectively organize resources, why do ''we find 'islands 
of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps 
of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk?"'161 Coase's answer to this 
question was transaction costs. 162 Finding goods and services and nego-
tiating terms to spot contracts for every single business transaction is 
expensive. These costs can be avoided through a single contract that 
gives a central authority the right of direction. "The contract," according 
to Coase, "is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which 
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entre-
preneur within certain /imits." 163 
154. /d. at 880--81. See also M!CKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 7-8 (discuss-
ing the Italian commenda). 
155. Mahoney, supra note 125, at 883-84. 
156. Jd. at 887-89. See also MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 40 (discuss-
ing the Bubble Act of 1720). 
157. Mahoney, supra note 125, at 886-92 (The Triumph of the Concession Theory). 
158. See generally Bratton, supra note 112, 1513-17 (arguing that the nexus of contract theory 
restates the older fiction theory of the corporation). 
159. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937) available at 
http:/ /people. bu. edu/vaguirre/courses/bu3 3 2/nature _firm. pdf. 
160. See id. at 394. 
161. /d. at 387 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (reprtd. & rev. 
1948)). 
162. Jd. at 390. 
163. Jd. 
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Later economists refined this model of the firm by pushing for an 
even more individualistic, contractual approach. In 1972, Alchian and 
Demsetz famously argued that Coase was mistaken to see managers as 
exercising even circumscribed control, since employees' willingness to 
follow direction was in every instance a matter of contractual choice.164 
Four years later, Jensen and Meckling summarized what was to become 
the conventional wisdom, writing that "[t]he private corporation or firm 
is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus of contracting 
relationships."165 More recently, even the nexus of contracts approach 
has come under attack as insufficiently contractual. 166 The hy-
per-contractual approach in effect completes the deconstruction of "con-
trol" and "ownership" that Coase began. In this theory, all the partici-
pants are "investors" contributing intellectual and reputational capital 
(employees) or cash and other resources (equity and debt). 167 Each set of 
participants then "controls" the other participants through monitoring and 
sanctions. For example: 
Employers often ... evaluate and reward or penalize the employee's 
behavior .... Less obviously, employees often exercise similar con-
trol. They grant the employer the power to set certain conditions of 
employment, to evaluate their performance, and to decide on bonuses 
and promotions, but then they evaluate the employer's performance 
and penalize or reward the employer (for example, by quitting or ex-
erting less or more effort in the future ).168 
In effect, these theorists simply dispense with the "nexus" in nexus of 
contracts theory, leaving only a web of interlocking connected con-
tracts.169 
For our purposes, particular solutions to the economic mystery of 
the firm's existence are less important than the paradigm that these theo-
ries create for understanding the nature of corporations. Coase and his 
progeny provide a way of conceptualizing the corporation as "a complex 
set of explicit and implicit contracts."170 There are two aspects of this 
approach that make it more hospitable to autonomy theories of contract 
than either the real or concession theories. First, the contractual ap-
proach to the firm is essentially individualistic. Unlike the real theory, it 
164. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
165. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,311 (1976). 
166. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REv. 887 (2000). 
167. See id. at 922-29. 
168. See id. at 921. 
169. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as a Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REv. I, 7-8 (2002) ("Although their [Gulati, Klien, and Zolt] new model remains contractarian in 
nature, it lacks a critical feature of the standard contractarian account- namely, a nexus."). 
170. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 
1416, 1418 (1989). 
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does not rely on any communitarian notion of collective determination or 
reified idea of the corporation independent of human constituents. 171 
Indeed, it denies that a corporation is fundamentally different from any 
other contractual endeavor. 172 Second, the contractual vision of the firm 
conceptualizes it as arising out of private rather than government 
choices. To be sure, nexus of contracts theorists acknowledge the exis-
tence of state promulgated corporate law, but they see these rules as pro-
viding contractual defaults in order to reduce transaction costs, rather 
than as concessions of government power designed to serve the purposes 
of the state. 173 Provisions of state corporate law that cannot be bargained 
around are analyzed as mandatory contractual provisions analogous to 
mandatory rules in contract law.174 
The nexus of contracts theory's insistence on the fictitious nature of 
the corporation also explains how liberal autonomy theorists could ana-
lyze firm-to-firm contracts. A contract between two firms appears to be 
a contract between two separate, non-human entities, but in reality in-
ter-fmn contracts incompletely describe the underlying agreements of 
actual human beings. The full terms of the agreement must be specified 
using not only the explicit terms of the contract and the regular rules of 
contract law, but also by the contracts-including the "contract" repre-
sented by corporate charters and management structures-which make 
up the corporations that signed the agreement. Ultimately contracts be-
tween corporations are agreements between actual human beings. The 
scope of the power of these human beings to "bind" other participants in 
the corporate enterprise will be limited by the background rules of corpo-
rate law. However, the nexus-of-contracts theory teaches us that ulti-
mately these rules can be thought of in largely consensual terms. Corpo-
rate agents exercising their discretion become essentially analogous to 
any other individual whose discretion and ability to bind others is limited 
by pre-existing contracts. The presence of the corporation form works 
no decisive shift in moral status. Thus, from the point of view of the 
nexus of contract theory, the Artificial Personality Argument is unten-
able. It mistakes a useful shorthand- the corporation-for a decisive 
difference where no such decisive difference exists. 175 
171. See id. at 1418-20. 
172. !d. 
173. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principals For The Post-Contractarian 
Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 565 (1996). 
174. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (setting forth general 
requirements of contractual capacity); !d. § 14 (limitations on the enforceability of contracts by 
infants); !d. § 15 (limitations on the enforceability of contracts by those with mental illnesses or 
defects); !d.§ 110 (listing of contracts covered by the Statute of frauds); !d.§ 178 (unenforceability 
of agreements on public policy grounds); !d. § 189 (contracts in restraint of marriage); !d. § 356 
(prohibition on penalty clauses). 
175. One arguably decisive difference is the limited liability provided by the corporate form. 
However, there is no reason that limited contractual liability cannot be created entirely by agree-
ment. Indeed limiting the pool of assets available to answer for a particular contract is routinely 
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The nexus of contracts theory, thus, turns the table on efficiency 
theorists who would invoke the Artificial Personality Argument. Just as 
the Artificial Personality Argument claims one has nothing to say when 
viewing firm-to-firm contracts through the lens of autonomy theories, 
when one views the Artificial Personality Argument through the lens of 
economics one finds that the conception of the corporation that the ar-
gument requires is not the one endorsed by contemporary law and eco-
nomics scholarship. 
One might object that the nexus of contracts response to the Artifi-
cial Personality Argument rests on an equivocation. The term "contract" 
in the nexus of contract theory176 does not mean the same thing that 
"contract" means in contract law and therefore the argument is falla-
cious.177 This criticism can be met in the following way. Economics and 
law clearly do not use the term "contract" in precisely the same way. 
When economists speak of contracts they are generally using the term 
broadly to include all voluntary transactions. 178 It can encompass every-
thing from simultaneous exchanges and informal deals to highly formal-
ized long-term written agreements. The important point is that the trans-
actions are consensual rather than required by government regulations or 
some other external source of coercion. 179 In contrast, lawyers use the 
term contract in a much more limited way. Thus, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) Contracts defines a contract as "a promise or set of promises for the 
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the 
law in some way recognizes as a duty."180 Generally, a contract requires 
the formalities of offer, acceptance, and consideration.181 The juristic 
done through devices such as non-recourse secured lending. Likewise, the liability shield provided 
by the corporate form is routinely waived - at least for some businesses - through personal guaran-
tees offered for corporate debts. Tort liability, of course, presents a different case, but there is no 
obvious reason why autonomy theories of contractual liability should be dramatically influenced by 
the scope of tort liability. 
176. Braucher, supra note 13, at 698-99. 
177. Cf Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1764 n.30 ( 1980) ("Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by 
reciprocal expectations and behavior .... "). 
178. !d. ("Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by reciprocal expec-
tations and behavior."). 
179. Melvin Eisenberg summed up this point, writing: 
In ordinary language, the term contract means an agreement. In law, the term means a 
legally enforceable promise. Pretty clearly, however, the nexus-of-contracts conception 
does not mean either that the corporation is a nexus of agreements or that it is a nexus of 
legally enforceable promises. Instead, the conception means that the corporation is a 
nexus of reciprocal arrangements. 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual 
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CoRP. L. 819, 822 (1999). 
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I (1981). See generally I E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §1.1 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the legal definition of"contract"). 
181. See, e.g., Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Alaska 1997) ("The formation of a 
valid contract requires an offer encompassing all essential terms, unequivocal acceptance by the 
offeree, consideration, and an intent to be bound."). The law of contract, of course, abounds with 
exceptions to these requirements and will enforce many agreements and promises that do not meet 
them. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82(1) (1981) (promise to pay a debt 
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and economic definitions of contract thus look quite different, and the 
charge of equivocation seems correct. The problem with this line of rea-
soning is that the Artificial Personality Argument itself is an attack on 
juristic categories. Insofar as the law is concerned, there is no difference 
between the contracts entered into by a corporation and those entered 
into by a natural person. 182 This is precisely the position that the Artifi-
cial Personality Argument rejects. Rather it insists that one must import 
non-juristic distinctions between persons and corporations-namely the 
distinction that says they are entitled to different sorts of moral respect-
into contract theory in order to understand the discontinuous nature of 
contract. 
Contracts between human beings and contracts between firms re-
quire differing theoretical approaches not because of any juristic distinc-
tion but because-all juristic categories aside-firms simply are not real 
people. The argument thus stands or falls based on the non-juristic dis-
tinctions that it is making. If, however, the nexus of contracts approach 
is accepted, then the activity of a firm can be understood in voluntaristic 
and individualistic terms. This is precisely what the Artificial Personal-
ity Argument denies. In the end, the equivocation response rests on a 
category mistake. It wrongly assumes that the Artificial Personality Ar-
gument is directed against a full-fledged set of juristic categories rather 
than against the more primitive concepts of person, choice, and auton-
omy employed by philosophical defenders of contract. 
C. The Failure of the Artificial Personality Argument 
The ultimate validity of the Artificial Personality Argument rests on 
which of the three competing theories of the corporation is "true." Cast 
in these terms, evaluating the argument is a daunting task. From at least 
the eleventh century to the present, debates have raged about the "true 
nature" of corporations, and it seems unlikely that a definitive answer to 
the question is going to emerge. However, it is important to remember 
that the Artificial Personality Argument need not be thought of as a 
free-standing claim about the nature of contracts and corporations. 
Rather it is part of a larger attempt to understand the relationship be-
tween autonomy and efficiency theories of contract. Seen in this context, 
the Artificial Personality Argument fails. Recall that the Artificial Per-
unrecoverable because of statute of limitations); /d. § 83 (promise to pay a debt discharged in bank-
ruptcy); /d.§ 84(1) (a promise to perform a duty conditioned on an event that did not occur); /d.§ 85 
(promise to perform a voidable duty), /d. § 86 (promise for past or moral consideration); /d. § 87 (a 
written option contract reciting consideration); /d. § 88 (a written guaranty reciting consideration); 
!d. § 89 (fair and equitable modification of an existing contract); /d. § 90 (promissory estoppel) 
(1982); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (firm offer rule). 
182. See, e.g., U.C.C. § l-20l(b)(26) (2003) ('"Party', as distinct from third-party, means a 
person who has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement within the code."); !d.§ l-20l(b)(27) 
('"Person' includes an individual or organization"); !d. § 2-204(1) ("A contract for the sale of good 
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which 
recognizes the existence of such a contract."). 
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sonality Argument was offered as a horizontal independence strategy as 
an attempt to reconcile autonomy and efficiency theories of contract by 
showing that they apply to different sorts of things. Hence, the Artificial 
Personality Argument can only demonstrate the horizontal independence 
of these theories if it is consistent with the economic approach that it 
seeks to defend. It is not. In assessing the Artificial Personality Argu-
ment we can thus move from daunting and loaded questions about the 
"true" nature of things to more tractable questions about the consistency 
of different pieces of a larger argument. 
Modem economics of the sort invoked by efficiency theories of 
contract is firmly committed to methodological individualism. 183 What 
this means is that the individual is taken as the basic unit of social expla-
nation.184 This methodological individualism, coupled with an assump-
tion of rationality and scarcity is what marks economics off from other 
social sciences such as sociology or anthropology. The insistence on 
rational individualism is more than a simple matter of policing discipli-
nary boundaries, however. It provides the basis for two important ambi-
tions of modem economics. The first ambition is that social scientific 
theories be falsifiable. Most economists in theory aspire to the Pop-
perian model of science in which theories generate predications that can 
then be falsified through observation.185 The gradual accretion of theo-
ries that withstand repeated attempts at falsification, as well as the rejec-
tion of theories that fail this test, is supposed to lead to increased scien-
tific knowledge of human activity. The insistence on individual rational-
ity allows economists to produce theories from which predictions can be 
rigorously and logically deduced. This deductive character makes the 
theories potentially falsifiable and hence, on Popper's view, scientific. 
The second ambition is theoretical unity. The rational actor model holds 
out the promise that a single mode of explanation can account for all 
interesting or important social phenomena. 186 Whatever the merits of 
183. See ROBERTS. PINDYCK & DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 59 (3d ed. 1995) 
(describing the basic assumptions of the rational actor model). 
184. Some economists, particularly those who place their hopes in sociobiology or neurosci-
ence reject the individualistic reductionism of mainstream economics, arguing that the basic units of 
social explanation are sub-individual, e.g., neuropathways, etc. See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat et al., 
Law & Neuroeconomics, (George Mason Law & Econ., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-07, 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=501063. 
185. See Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY § 4.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2003), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/ ("Karl Popper's philosophy of science has been influen-
tial among economists."). Compare MAX BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: OR HOW 
ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN (1992) with TERRENCE HUTCHISON, ON THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE FORMALIST REVOLUTION (2000) (prominent defenses of a Popperian approach to econom-
ics); KARL POPPER, The Logic of the Social Sciences, in THE POSITIVIST DISPUTE IN GERMAN 
SOCIOLOGY 87 (Teodor W. Adorno et al., eds. Glyn Adey & David Frisby trans., Harper & Row 
Publishers 1976) (setting forth his own theory of social science). 
186. See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC 
SCIENCE 15-16 (1932) (defining economics as the science which studies human behavior as a rela-
tionship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses). Robbins was an early and 
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these ambitions, they demonstrate that methodological individualism is 
not some secondary part of modem economics but rather is central to the 
entire intellectual enterprise. 
The rational actor of economics and the autonomous individual of 
liberalism are slightly different people. One can be an economist without 
being a liberal, and one can be a liberal without subscribing to the shib-
boleths of microeconomic theory. Both positions, however, share a hos-
tility to the collectivism of the real theory of corporations. For example, 
the gravamen of liberal social contract theory is that the individual is 
prior to the community, which must be justified in individualistic terms. 
Likewise, economists have insisted that collective action must be under-
stood by reference to individual choices and incentives. 187 Neither the-
ory is hospitable to Gierke's claims about collective wills and Gnossen-
shaft. The concession theory is less overtly inconsistent with economic 
theory, but from an economic point of view it is ultimately question beg-
ging. Even if one accepted it as a historical account of the rise of the 
corporation's legal personality, Coase and his progeny point out that one 
is still left with the question of why economic activity is carried out by 
firms at all. Answering that question in the individualistic terms of mod-
em economics leads inevitably toward the nexus of contract theory. In 
short, efficiency theorists cannot invoke the Artificial Personality Argu-
ment to side step the competing claims of autonomy theorists without 
simultaneously endorsing (if only implicitly) theories of the corporation 
that are at odds with the basic assumptions of economics. 
V. APPLYING AUTONOMY THEORIES TO THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS: 
THE EXAMPLE OF INTERPRETATION 
The arguments presented above show that one cannot dismiss 
autonomy theories from firm-to-firm contracts on the basis of an a priori 
claim about the nature of the corporation. The fiction theory-and in 
particular the nexus-of-contracts theory--demonstrates that one needn't 
assume that firm-to-firm contracts somehow belong to a different meta-
physical class from contracts between individuals that renders them 
unamenable to autonomy theories. However, the a priori failure of the 
Artificial Personality Argument does not necessarily mean that autonomy 
theories have anything to offer to our understanding of firm-to-firm con-
tracts. Unless autonomy theories suggest results that differ from those 
generated by the economic theories offered in their place, the failure of 
influence advocate for an expansive view of economics. A more recent writer taking a similar 
position is Richard Posner, who claims: 
[E]conomics is the science of rational choice in a world - our world - in which resources 
are limited in relation to human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is to explore 
the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satis-
factions- what we shall call his 'self-interest.' 
POSNER, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
187. See, e.g., MACUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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the Artificial Personality Argument remains an essentially scholastic 
point. The issue of contract interpretation offers an example of how 
autonomy and efficiency theories sharply diverge when applied to firm-
to-firm contracts. 
A. Hyper-Formalism and the Efficiency Norm 
One must first understand the striking results that a consistent appli-
cation of the efficiency norm to contractual interpretation yields. Ac-
cording to the ingenious argument put forward by Schwartz and Scott, if 
one's only goal is to maximize the joint gains from contracting, then one 
ought to adopt a very hard version of the plain meaning rule. 188 Rather 
than looking to all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction and 
evidence of the intention of the parties, one should interpret the words of 
the contract as literally as possible. Going hand in hand with this Fosi-
tion is an equally hard-edged version of the parol evidence rule. 18 In 
short, contractual interpretation should be simplified to a literal reading 
of the language within the four corners of a written contract and nothing 
more. This hyper-formalist approach rests on three inter-related con-
cepts: cost, risk, and diversification. 
All things being equal, the efficiency norm suggests that low-cost 
dispute resolution is to be preferred to high-cost dispute resolution. Hy-
per-formalism has the obvious advantage of cheap dispute resolution. 
One can dispense with expensive and time-consuming fact-finding, with 
the attendant army of disputes and arguments over the reliability and 
interpretation of evidence. One simply reads the contract without refer-
ence to any divergence between that reading and the actual intent of the 
parties. 
The obvious objection to such an approach is that sometimes it will 
produce ''wrong" interpretations that vary significantly from anything 
envisioned by the parties. One of the insights provided by Schwartz and 
Scott is that stopping the analysis at this point is a mistake. 190 The next 
question should be whether the "mistakes" produced by hyper-formalism 
are systematic. Do they consistently favor one group in a way that can 
be predicted in advance? Schwartz and Scott conclude that they do 
not. 191 Accordingly, they argue that we should not care about the "mis-
188. Schwartz & Scott, supra note I 0, at 569 ("Typical firms prefer courts to make interpreta-
tions on a narrow evidentiary base whose most significant component is the written contract."). 
189. "Under [the parol evidence rule] when the parties to a contract embody their agreement in 
writing and intend the writing to be the final expression of their agreement, the terms of the writing 
may not be varied or contradicted by evidence of any prior written or oral agreement .... " BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990). 
190. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 575-76. 
191. !d. at 575-76. Schwartz and Scott are careful not to overstate their case, acknowledging 
that under some circumstances profit maximizing firms would not be indifferent to contract "misin-
terpretation." !d. at 576-77. 
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takes" in the context of corporate contracts. 192 A corporation is going to 
have lots of contracts. Hence, it can expect to "win" about as often as it 
"loses" under a regime of hyper-formalist contract interpretation. A 
firm's contracts thus become analogous to a diversified stock portfolio. 193 
The investor in such a stock portfolio should be risk-neutral as to any 
particular stock, since diversification allows one to balance declining 
stocks with advancing stocks. The only thing that matters is the aggre-
gate performance of the portfolio. Similarly, if our sole goal is to maxi-
mize the value of a firm, we should be indifferent to the "performance" 
of any particular contract under a hyper-formalist interpretation regime. 
So long as "winning" interpretations are as frequent as "losing" interpre-
tations, the risk of judicial "mistakes" is diversified away and the firm 
realizes the full benefits of the cheaper resolution of contractual disputes. 
The analogy to a stock portfolio also illustrates the stockholder cen-
tric nature of the efficiency argument for hyper-formalism. It ultimately 
privileges the position of a diversified investor whose only goal is to 
maximize the return on her investment. Such an investor would clearly 
prefer the hyper-formalist interpretation regime. On the other hand, 
managers and employees, for whom the corporation is not simply an 
income stream, but also, a place where they spend much of their time and 
lavish much of their energy, 194 quite possibility might prefer that their 
plans and arrangements be carried out according to their intentions, 
rather than falling victim to random-albeit evenly distributed-
misinterpretation by the courts. The question thus becomes why we 
should adopt the perspective of such an investor. Schwartz and Scott 
offer essentially two reasons for taking this position. The first is that 
stockholders "own" the corporation and· are entitled by that "ownership" 
to have the firm's contracts interpreted to maximize the value of their 
investment. 195 The second is that employees of a corporation are re-
quired by law to maximize shareholder value. 196 Upon closer examina-
tion, however, the argument from ownership turns out to be circular and 
the argument from the legal requirements of employees rests on an over-
simplification of corporate law. 
As a legal matter, it is not true that shareholders "own" a corpora-
tion, and once the claim is unpacked it seems to be little more than a re-
statement of a conclusion. Legally speaking, shareholders are the resid-
ual claimants on the assets of a corporation and have the ability to exer-
192. See id. at 550-54. 
193. This analogy is mine rather than Schwartz and Scott's. 
194. MJCKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116 (noting that people live much of their 
lives and work out much of their identity within the context of corporations). 
195. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 550-51 ("A firm is direct by its owners, who often are 
shareholders. Shareholders prefer their firms to maximize profits .... "). 
196. !d. at 551 ("[T]he legal rules that attempt to deter bad manager behavior fall into the 
domains of the criminal, corporate, and securities laws. Contract law should exploit this specializa-
tion by assuming that the agreements it regulates reflect the parties' maximizing choices."). 
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cise some power through their voting over its management. Sharehold-
ers, however, lack many of the other crucial indicia of property owners. 
For example, they do not have day-to-day control over a corporation or 
its assets. 197 They do not have the right to exclude others from a corpora-
tion's property. By virtue of owning stock in the General Electric Com-
pany ("GE"), I do not have the power to throw someone out of a GE fac-
tory. Indeed, not only do stockholders lack the ability to exclude others 
from corporate property, they themselves can be excluded from it. Were 
I to trespass on GE's property, my ownership of GE stock would not 
constitute a valid defense to a tort action against me. 198 One might still 
assert that shareholders are the owners of the company in some important 
normative sense. Whatever this sense, it is not one that we usually asso-
ciate with property. No one, to my knowledge, argues that shareholders 
should be given all the incidents of control that would flow from treating 
a corporation as their property. No one, for example, argues that GE 
stockholders should be exempt from the law of trespass as it applies to 
GE property. In short, the claim that stockholders own the corporation 
amounts neither to the claim that they exercise full legal property rights 
in a corporation nor to the claim that they should exercise such legal 
rights in the corporation. Ultimately, it amounts to the claim that corpo-
rations ought to be run for the benefit of shareholders. Yet this is pre-
cisely the conclusion that that concept of ownership was invoked to sup-
port. Hence, introducing the concept of property into the discussion of 
the shareholder's status neither accurately states the law nor materially 
advances the normative discussion. In this context, it amounts to little 
more than a restatement of the conclusion being argued for. 199 
It is far from clear that employees of a corporation are required by 
law to run a corporation so as to maximize shareholder value. For start-
ers, dozens of states have passed laws explicitly allowing corporate man-
agers to consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than 
shareholders, e.g., employees or members of the community in which a 
197. Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 433 (App. Div. 1962) (holding that shareholders 
cannot require management to follow particular business policies); Associated Grocers of Ala., Inc. 
v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp. 990, 966 (N.D. Ala. 1948) (same), Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 
N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912) (same), Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cunninghame, 
(1906) 2 Ch. 34 (U.K.) (same). 
198. My status as a stockholder, however, would guarantee me access to corporate property for 
the purposes of inspecting the books. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2005). See also Susan B. 
Hoffnagle & Jolyan A. Butler, Shareholders' Right to Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 4 
CONN. L. REv. 707 (1972) (discussing the scope of shareholder's inspection rights). 
199. William W. Bratton summarizes this point thus: 
"Ownership" becomes as irrelevant a concept as "firm entity" [under the nexus of con-
tracts theory]. The "firm" is only a series of contracts covering inputs being joined so as 
to become output. "Capital," and thus the traditional legal situs of ownership, devolves 
into one of the many types of inputs. 
Bratton, supra note 112, at 1499. Cf Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 164, at 781-83, 789 n.l4 
(owners contract for rights to anticipated residual rewards). 
134 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1 
corporation is located. 200 The practical effect of these statutes has been 
fairly minimal.201 However, their limited significance does not come 
from a powerful, countervailing legal requirement that employees man-
age a corporation in the interests of the shareholders. Rather, it comes 
from the fact that corporate managers are granted broad discretion in 
how they manage corporations. 
The courts have frequently declared that corporate managers are fi-
duciaries of the corporation.202 In practice, however, this fiduciary status 
places few limits on managerial decision-making. It does create substan-
tial legal requirements with regard to the theft of corporate assets or op-
portunities/03 but the business judgment rule provides a virtually im-
penetrable shield from legal oversight of ordinary business decisions. 204 
So long as a manager complies with the proper formalities and exercises 
some basic modicum of care she is immune from legal attack and the 
courts will not second guess her decisions?05 Furthermore, although the 
corporation may sue a manager for breach of fiduciary duty and a share-
holder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, a share-
holder himself generally cannot sue misbehaving corporate managers for 
most kinds of misbehavior. 206 
200. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e), 
repealed by CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 33-756 (2004); FLA. STAT.§ 607.0830(3) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 30-1602, -1702 (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 
(2005); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-1-35-I(d), (f), (g) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 491.101B (West 
2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12- 210(4) (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:92(G)(2) 
(2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 65 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2004); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2005); MO. REV. STAT.§ 351.347 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-
2035(c) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
35(0) (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (Consol. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 
1701.59(£) (LexisNexis 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2005); PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 515- 16 
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 47-33-4 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 
180.0827 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 17-16-830(e) (2005) (enacted 1989). 
201. See Robert Kannel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 6! GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1156 
(1993); Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579 (1992). 
202. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), Pueblo Bancorp v. Lindoe, 
Inc., 37 P.3d 492, 499 (Colo. App. 2001), In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 878 A.2d 
975,999-1000 (2005). 
203. See, e.g., Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985), Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71 
(Minn. 1974), Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940), Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). See 
also Victor Brudney & Robert Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 
997 (1981). 
204. The business judgment rule "immunizes management from liability in corporate transac-
tion[s] undertaken within both power of corporation and authority of management where there is 
reasonable basis to indicate that transaction was made with due care and in good faith." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1990). 
205. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d 805 (holding that Delaware law presumes that managers act 
in good faith and in the best interests of the firm). Under Delaware law, even an explicit showing of 
bad-faith or incompetence is not sufficient for legal interference with the business decisions so long 
as a defendant can prove the "entire fairness" of the transaction. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). 
206. As the Delaware Chancery Court has explained: 
A bill filed by stockholders in their derivative right . . . has two phases - one is the 
equivalent of a suit to compel the corporation to sue, and the other is the suit by the cor-
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To be sure, one can find precatory language in judicial opinions to 
the effect that corporations should be run in the interest of the sharehold-
ers, but the business judgment rule insures that such language has little if 
any real impact on managerial decision making. In any case, there is 
reason to believe that such language was never meant to enshrine the 
shareholder primacy norm. The locus classicus for the shareholder pri-
macy norm is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,207 where the Michigan Supreme 
Court stated: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself to the reduction of profits, or to the nondis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes. 208 
When this dicta is viewed in context, however, it is clear that what is 
involved is not a generalized duty by managers to maximize shareholder 
value, but rather, a prohibition on the oppression of minority sharehold-
ers in the case of a closely held corporation. The case arose out a dispute 
between Henry Ford and the Dodge brothers, who owned ten percent of 
the stock in Ford Motor Company.209 The Dodge brothers opposed 
Henry Ford's management style and wished to set up their own car com-
pany to compete with Ford.210 Henry Ford wanted to forestall this by 
denying capital to the Dodge brothers and forcing them out of the com-
pany.211 Accordingly, Henry Ford had the board of directors cease the 
payment of stock dividends and then he himself resigned, went to Cali-
fornia, and announced that he would be setting up a new car company to 
compete with Ford.212 All of these antics were ploys to depress the value 
of the Dodge brother's Ford Motor Company stock and force them out.213 
Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled for the Dodge brothers 
not because of some generalized duty to maximize share value, but 
rather, because of the right of dissenting minority shareholders to be free 
poration, asserted by the stockholders on its behalf, against those liable to it. The former 
belongs to the complaining shareholders; the latter to the corporation. The complaining 
stockholders are allowed in derivative bills to bring forward those two causes of action in 
one suit. 
Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 76 (Del. Ch. 1939). Accord Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ill. 
1988) ("The derivative action really consists of two causes of action; one against the directors for 
failing to sue; and the second based upon the right belonging to the corporation."). 
207. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
208. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
209. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,316 (1997). 
210. See id. 
211. See id. at 317-18. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. 
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from unreasonable oppression.214 The court pointedly did not issue an 
injunction against plant expansions that the Dodge brothers believed 
would be unprofitable, citing the business judgment rule.215 
B. Autonomy Theories and Interpretation 
By and large, autonomy theories prescribe a different method of in-
terpreting contracts. If contract law is a matter of enforcing a particular 
set of commitments that individuals make as a way of expanding their 
liberty, then it follows that we must know what the individuals them-
selves committed to. Indeed, to the extent the "misinterpretation" of a 
contract-that is an interpretation that varies from the intent of the par-
ties-leads to legal coercion, we are faced with the primal question of 
liberal political theory, namely the justification of collective violence. 
Autonomy theories of contract purport to answer this question in the 
limited case of self-imposed or consensual legal obligations.216 Once 
contractual liability goes beyond such self-imposed obligations, how-
ever, it can no longer be justified by autonomy theories. These consid-
erations mean that autonomy theories of contract must take a broader 
approach to contractual interpretation than the hyper-formalism sug-
gested by a single-minded devotion to the efficiency norm. This does 
not mean that autonomy theories are committed to a wholly subjective 
theory of interpretation. As Charles Fried has written: 
It is a truism in the philosophy of language that in interpreting a per-
son's words we are not guessing at the hidden but determined content 
of some list of meanings in the speaker's head. Rather our concerns 
. 1 . d . h . 217 parttcu anze ren er concrete, me oate meamngs. 
Such an approach, however, does require an attention to context and in-
tention that would be foreclosed by a rule limiting inquiry into a con-
tract's meaning to a literal interpretation of the plain meaning of a signed 
document. 
Just as the nature and law of corporations does not provide any rea-
son for adopting the shareholder primacy norm implicit in the argument 
of the new lex mercatoria, it also provides no reason for rejecting auton-
214. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 ("There should be no confusion ... of the duties which Mr. 
Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law 
he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders."). 
215. !d. (confessing that "judges are not business experts."). Dodge can be profitably con-
trasted with the well-known Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) in which a 
disgruntled shareholder argued that the refusal of the Chicago Cubs' management to install night 
stadium lighting decreased profits. The court held that the board was not obligated to make profits 
their sole goal and could appropriately consider factors such as the impact of their decisions on the 
community and on the game of baseball as a whole. !d. at 180-82. See also ARTHUR R. PINTO & 
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 19 (1999) (distinguishing Dodge from 
Shlensky on the grounds that Dodge involved oppression of minority shareholders). 
216. FRIED, supra note 55, at 16. 
217. ld.at60. 
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omy theories. Armed with an understanding of the corporation as a 
nexus of contracts, one can apply the broader notion of interpretation 
inherent in autonomy theories to contracts between corporations. The 
easiest way of illustrating this is through a thought experiment. Imagine 
an entrepreneur who has a new idea around which he builds his business. 
In order to advance his goals he enters into various contracts with indi-
viduals and companies. His decision to make these contracts is an exer-
cise of his liberty. To be sure, part of his motivation is profit. However, 
this is by no means his sole motivation. People start businesses for many 
reasons-such as the desire for independence or to be one's own boss-
that are not easily reducible to simple profits.218 Furthermore, liberal 
philosophy's indifference to ends means that, properly speaking, our 
entrepreneur's motives are irrelevant. What matters is whether his ac-
tions violate the liberal principle. Provided that they do not, the law 
should further his autonomous choices by enforcing his contracts. Or, so 
say the autonomy theories.219 
As our entrepreneur's business grows, his contracts will become 
more complex. He will develop relationships with employees, suppliers, 
and creditors that will be governed by long-term agreements. No doubt, 
these contracts will present knotty issues of interpretation. Language 
may be vague and many assumptions will be left implicit. Nevertheless, 
autonomy theories have a reasonably clear set of implications. We ought 
to be willing to expend judicial resources and require that parties incur 
costlier litigation in order to see to it that each contract, insofar as it is 
possible to do so, is enforced to accord with the original intent of the 
parties. In many cases, the ultimate purpose of the parties to these con-
tracts will be to maximize their wealth. According to autonomy theories, 
however, this is not the primary concern of contract law.220 The reason is 
that the law of contract represents state action compelling one party to a 
lawsuit against his or her will. As such, it must stand the test of the lib-
eral principle, which requires that the state be indifferent to its citizens' 
ends, focusing instead upon the protection and advancement of their lib-
erty. Hence, autonomy theories require that we inquire into the actual 
intent and meaning of our entrepreneur's contracts. 
Thus far, there is nothing in the nature of our entrepreneur's con-
tracts that would lead us to believe that they ought to be analyzed using 
218. This point is hardly confined to the case of entrepreneurs. Most people make professional 
and career decisions on the basis of a complex set of factors, of which monetary profit is but a single 
-and often not the most important- part. Consider, for example, the fact that such talented lawyers 
as Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz could surely make more money working on Wall Street or K 
Street than they currently do at Yale Law School and the University of Virginia. 
219. FRIED, supra note 55, at 7 ("But whatever we accomplish and however that accomplish-
ment is judged, morality requires that we respect the person and property of others, leaving them free 
to make their lives as we are left free to make ours. This is the liberal ideal."). 
220. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
206, 224 (Peter Benson ed. 200 I). 
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some new set of theories. Now suppose that he faces the problem of 
asset partitioning. 221 He wants to specify that certain assets under his 
control will be available to answer for the debts of his business but other 
assets should not be available to answer such debts. As we have seen 
there are a variety of ways in which he might accomplish this. For ex-
ample, he could structure his debts as non-recourse loans secured by his 
widget-making machine. As is common in such transactions, he might 
enter into covenants that would limit his control over the widget-making 
machine, agreeing, for example, that he will maintain it in good working 
order and not sell it without first paying the debt. 
Over time, the accretion of such contracts would do two things for 
our entrepreneur. First, it would significantly limit his personal liability 
for payment of "business" debts.222 Second, it would significantly limit 
his former freedom to control "business" property without subjecting 
himself to the risk of significant personal liability.223 Neither of these 
changes, however, represents any fundamental change in the nature of 
the contracts of the entrepreneur from the point of view of autonomy 
theories. The limitations on personal liability are simply terms in par-
ticular contracts, representing the choices of autonomous individuals 
pursuing their chosen ends. Likewise, the entrepreneur's loss of control 
over particular assets does not mean that his liberty is no longer the 
structuring normative principle of contract enforcement. It simply means 
respect for that liberty requires honoring his choice to give up certain 
freedoms and that he be subjected to liability for the violation of certain 
self-imposed duties and obligations to others. Under autonomy theories, 
however, both ofthese propositions are true of any contract.224 
Now suppose that our entrepreneur decides to get around the asset-
partitioning problem in a different way. Rather than doing so by using 
secured lending and other explicitly contractual devices, he chooses to 
incorporate his business. This action will do three things. First, it will 
limit his personal liability. Those assets that he assigns to the new corpo-
ration will now be answerable exclusively for corporate debts, and in the 
absence of some further contract, his personal assets will be immune 
from attachment by corporate creditors. Second, it will limit his control 
over business assets. How much this control is limited will depend on 
essentially two things. The first is the corporate law of the state in which 
he incorporates the business. 225 Second, the terms of the corporate char-
221. See text accompanying notes 146 & 158. 
222. See Lynn LoPucki, The End of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. I, 14-19 (1997) (arguing that 
secured lending allows debtors effectively to avoid or limit most of their liability). 
223. For example, the non-recourse loan in the preceding paragraph might contain a covenant 
not to sell the widget-making machine, the violation of which would subject our entrepreneur to full 
personal liability for the loan. 
224. FRIED, supra note 55, at 14, 16-17. 
225. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 215, at 2 ("Every state has a corporate law statute that 
provides the rules for the corporations incorporated in that state .... "). 
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ter and bylaws will place further limits on his power.226 The third thing 
that incorporation will allow our entrepreneur to do is raise money by · 
offering stock to others. Offering stock may further limit his control 
over the business by subjecting him to obligations in addition to those 
contained in the state law and the corporate charter, most notably federal 
securities regulations. 
By now, our entrepreneur will be hedged in by a variety of legal ob-
ligations. He is no longer the solo operator more or less free from legal 
constraints that he was when he first began his business. However, all of 
these new obligations are the result of voluntary actions by him and those 
to whom he becomes obligated. Furthermore, there is a well-developed 
body of law that defines the scope and meaning of those obligations, and 
as we have seen, there is nothing in that body of law suggesting that he 
has consented to a fundamental shift in how his business contracts should 
be interpreted. To be sure, the laws of corporate governance and agency 
now impact the legal effect of his contracts on behalf of the corporation, 
but none of these bodies of law suggests that some new kind of contract 
law applies to the contracts he enters into as part of his business. Nor do 
they require that profit be the goal of his contracts. 
One might object that even if autonomy theories can be applied to 
relatively small and autocratically run corporations where contracts rep-
resent the will of a single manager with merely bounded power, they 
cannot be applied to the contracts of more complex corporations. The 
"decisions" of these larger corporations cannot be thought of as those of 
a single individual. As Jensen and Meckling put it: 
[T]he "behavior" of the ftrm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the 
outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the 
trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but 
we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they 
were persons with motivations and intentions?27 
One could argue that the idealized story of the entrepreneur presented 
above obscures this fact. When we recognize that corporate behavior is 
being dictated by complex market forces rather than individual decisions, 
then autonomy theories ought to be jettisoned. 
The problem with this objection is that ultimately it proves too 
much. Every time a corporation makes a contract, it does so because 
some actual individual has come to some decision as to how he or she 
will exercise the discretion that belongs to her. Despite Dan-Cohen's 
hypothetical, in our world it remains an irreducible fact that contracts by 
corporations are always made by human beings. The legal scope of a 
226. !d. at 11 ("The articles [of incorporation] may also contain other significant discretionary 
provisions authorized by statute."). 
227. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 165, at 311. 
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corporate agent's discretion will be set by the law of corporations, which 
as we have seen, does not commit her to an a priori duty to maximize 
stockholder value. Nevertheless, as Jensen and Meckling rightly point 
out, she will be subject to pressures created by the market-like forces 
within the firm that will ultimately dictate many contractual terms.228 
The question thus becomes whether the fact that the terms of the contract 
are, in some sense, the outcome of a complex "market" renders the re-
sulting contract fundamentally different than other contracts in the way 
posited by the Artificial Personality Argument. Once the question is 
seen in these terms, its answer becomes straightforward. Virtually every 
contract will contain terms that are determined by complex market trans-
actions. The most obvious example is the price term in a sales con-
tract. 229 If one neighbor sells a used lawnmower to another neighbor, the 
market in lawnmowers will largely control the price term. Absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, the seller cannot charge $10,000 for the 
lawnmower because the buyer can easily purchase a new lawnmower at 
Home Depot for considerably less money. A host of factors ranging 
from the demand for lawnmowers in the local area to the price of steel on 
international commodity markets, in turn, will determine the price at 
Home Depot. If the mere fact that an implicit or explicit term in a con-
tract resulted from complex market transactions was sufficient to dismiss 
autonomy theories of contract, virtually every contract would be beyond 
the reach of such theories. Such a claim would be controversial to say 
the least and is clearly beyond the scope of the Artificial Personality Ar-
gument. 
The idealized story of our entrepreneur illustrates an important 
point, namely that we ought not to be seduced by the language of entity 
that surrounds our discussion of corporations. To be sure, it is extremely 
useful to talk and think about corporations as separate entities in many 
contexts. However, 
The "personhood" of a corporation is a matter of convenience rather 
than reality .... There are many actors, from production employees 
to managers to equity investors to debt investors to holders of war-
ranty and tort claims against the ftrm. The arrangements among 
these persons usually depend on contracts and on positive law, not on 
corporate law or the status of the corporation as an entity. More of-
228. !d. 
229. See ROBERTS. PINDYCK & DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 19 (5th ed. 2001) 
("What [the 1 price and quantity [of goods 1 will be depends on the particular characteristics of supply 
and demand. Variations of price and quantity over time depend on the ways in which supply and 
demand respond to other economic variables, such as aggregate economic activity and labor costs, 
which are themselves changing."). 
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ten than not a reference to the corporation as an entity will hide the 
fth . 230 essence o e transaction. 
This is certainly true when corporate personality is invoked to explain 
what corporate contracts are "really" about. 
The actors involved in the idealized story of our entrepreneur-
customers, creditors, employees, stockholders and the entrepreneur him-
self-will all have different motives and goals in participating in the 
business. From the point of view of the liberal philosophy embedded in 
autonomy theories of contract, the point of the exercise is not to maxi-
mize the returns for a single group--stockholders-Qr even for all 
groups, but rather, to facilitate the peaceful co-operation of individuals 
pursuing disparate ends. Jules Coleman has written that the market can 
be thought of as an essentially political institution that allows those with 
widely differing conceptions of the good to nevertheless cooperate 
peacefully with one another.231 The nexus-of-contracts theory teaches us 
that the corporation is simply the market in another guise.232 In this 
sense, the nexus-of-contracts theory makes the corporation into a much 
weaker concept than is assumed by the Artificial Personality Argument. 
As two of the nexus-of-contracts theory's most prominent proponents 
have argued: 
An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of the corpora-
tion removes from the field of interesting questions one that has 
plagued many writers: What is the goal of the corporation? Is it 
profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly defmed? Is there 
anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to 
maximize profit over the long run or the short run? Our response to 
such questions is: Who cares? If the New York Times is formed to 
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be 
allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning consented, 
and those who came later bought stock the price of which reflected 
the corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective.233 
If corporations are enterprises defined by the emergent pattern of 
individual agreements rather than some master norm of economic effi-
ciency, it do~s not mean that entrepreneurs and others should not be free 
230. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991). 
231. See JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) ("Markets are most attractive where 
individuals have broadly divergent conceptions of the good .... "). According to Coleman, "The 
market is a particularly appropriate form of rational organization under certain sets of empirical 
circumstances, including heterogeneity of values, cultural diversity, geographic dispersion and the 
like. In such communities markets contribute to social stability. That is their attraction to liberal 
political theory." /d. 
232. But cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 230, at 14 ("Just as there is no right amount 
of paint in a car, there is no right relation among managers, investors, and other corporate partici-
pants. The relation must be worked out one firm at a time."). 
233. /d. at 35-36. 
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to opt into the regime of hyper-formalism advocated by Schwartz and 
Scott. Nothing in the arguments offered above suggest that their basic 
insight that hyperformalism increases the value of contracts taken to-
gether is incorrect. No doubt, the sole goal of some parties (perhaps 
most parties) is to maximize the value of their contracts as a portfolio. 
Autonomy theories have no objection to parties choosing such a hyper-
formalist regime either through integration clauses or-more effec-
tively-through arbitration agreements that move litigation over con-
tracts into private, hyperformalist ·forums. Indeed, there is empirical 
evidence suggesting that parties who have a bundle of largely fungible 
commodity contracts prefer precisely the kind of hyper-formalism advo-
cated by Schwartz and Scott and have created private forums accord-
ingly.234 
All of this is unobjectionable to autonomy theories so long as it 
represents the actual intent of the parties, rather than a one-size fits all 
norm imposed by law. This stance necessarily commits autonomy theo-
ries to an inescapable first question when interpreting contracts: What is 
the intent of the parties? Even when the intent is that other intentions be 
ignored and that a written agreement be woodenly interpreted, autonomy 
theories require that we first identify this intention. Such an inquiry will 
inevitably impose costs that could be avoided by adopting the regime 
envisioned by Schwartz and Scott. Although I have argued elsewhere for 
the priority of liberty to welfare in contract law,235 I freely admit that 
such increased costs may be a valid objection to autonomy theories. It 
must be noted, however, that such objections have nothing whatsoever to 
do with the nature of corporations. The argument applies equally well to 
contracts between individuals, and as we have seen incorporation works 
no legal or metaphysical transformation on the contracts negotiated be-
tween firms. Ultimately, the question must be fought out on the merits 
of the respective theories themselves. · 
VI. A LESSON FOR CONTRACT THEORY 
The demise of the Artificial Personality Argument illustrates one of 
the key problems facing the "horizontal independence" strategy. Recall 
that the horizontal independence strategy seeks to resolve the conflict 
between autonomy theories and efficiency theories by demonstrating that 
they are actually theories of different things. The Artificial Personality 
Argument ultimately flounders on the fact that both the economics relied 
on by the welfare theorists and the liberal political philosophy relied on 
by the autonomy theorists are essentially individualistic. This commit-
234. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) (discussing contract interpre-
tation in merchant courts set up by commodity traders). 
235. See Oman, supra note 12, at 1499-1503 (arguing for the priority, but not the exclusivity, 
of autonomy theories on the basis of the philosophy of John Rawls). 
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ment to individualism means that neither approach can consistently in-
voke some non-individualistic concept such as the corporation to side-
step any conflicts. To be sure, they use individualism in different ways, 
but in the end, they are talking about the same things: actual human be-
ings. This convergence is precisely what the horizontal independence 
strategy seeks to deny. 
The ultimate convergence ofboth welfare and autonomy theories on 
the individual comes from two forms of reductionism that are key to con-
temporary economics. First, economics in its positive form is reduction-
ist, focusing on the individual rational actor as the primary unit of social 
explanation. Second, economics is normatively reductionist in that it 
once again uses individuals as the primary unit of measurement. When 
economists speak of efficiency or wealth maximization they are talking 
in terms of social aggregates. What economists are aggregating, how-
ever, are the satisfactions of individuals. Hence, there is no sense in 
which society is deemed to have or experience satisfaction independent 
of the individuals who make it up. These two forms of reductionism are 
what make economics such an attractive tool for policy analysis. The 
rational actor model allows a policy analyst to predict the effects of par-
ticular policies by deducing how agents bent on satisfaction of their pref-
erences would behave in response. The same deductive model allows us 
to make comparative judgments about the extent to which differing poli-
cies satisfy preferences. Both the positive and the normative judgments 
focus our attention relentlessly on the individual, and it is at this point 
that the conflict with autonomy theories becomes inevitable. 
The vast majority of law and economics literature on contracts is 
implicitly or explicitly normative.236 Economic theorists of contract law 
do not regard efficiency as simply one potentially interesting equilibrium 
point predicted by their positive model of contracting behavior.237 
Rather, they use it as criteria for judging the desirability of differing rules 
of law.238 When coupled with the methodological individualism of eco-
236. See Kraus, supra note 23, at 694 ("Legal theory is both a normative and explanatory 
enterprise. Most contemporary contract theories at least implicitly pursue both enterprises simulta-
neously."). 
23 7. A. Mitchell Polinsky provides a representative example of the ease with which economic 
theorists use the concept of efficiency as a normative criteria, invoking it as both a welfare maximiz-
ing principle and as an indicator of hypothetical consent: 
Contract law can be viewed as filling in [the] "gaps" in the contract - attempting to re-
produce what the parties would have agreed to if they could have costlessly planned for 
the event initially. Since the parties would have included contract terms that maximize 
their joint benefits net their joint costs - both parties can thereby be made better off- this 
approach is equivalent to designing contract law according to the efficiency criterion. 
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (3d ed. 2003). 
238. See, e.g., Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard L. Smith, Contract Law, Mutual Mistake, and 
Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 467 (1990); Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 
87 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J. L. & ECON. 691 (1983); 
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nomics, efficiency theories of contract will necessarily discuss the same 
things as autonomy theories because while each theory conceptualizes 
human individuality differently, both approaches are ultimately directed 
at actual people. The conflict can only be resolved using the horizontal 
independence strategy if one of the theories abandons its claim to being 
normative. 239 This happy solution is unlikely to work. Although auton-
omy theories might be conceptualized purely as interpretations of exist-
ing legal doctrines, the fact of the matter is that those who adopt auton-
omy theories almost universally tend to do so because they find the theo-
ries normatively attractive on the merits.240 Likewise, the convergence of 
positive and normative individualism in economics means that few law 
and economics scholars are going to give up their role as prescriptive 
policy analysts. So long as efficiency theorists and autonomy theorists 
both offer arguments for how contract law should be, a conflict remains 
to be solved. The idea of a new lex mercatoria may play a role in such a 
resolution, but if it does it will likely employ a vertical integration strat-
egy such as that put forth by Farber,241 rather than the horizontal inde-
pendence approach of the Artificial Personality Argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the criticisms that I have made of attempts to establish effi-
ciency as a master norm for contract law, this article is not an exercise in 
econophobia. I believe that economics offers important insights into the 
law242 and that ultimately no theory of contract can afford not to incorpo-
rate the insights of law and economics.243 Nor, despite the fact that I 
have spent much of this article defending them, am I ultimately per-
suaded by autonomy theories of contract. Rather, I believe that contract 
theory must find some principled integration of the two approaches. 
Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible 
Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 515 (I 98I); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, II 
BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the 
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory of Efficient Breach, 
77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis for Breach of Contract, I J. 
LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972). 
239. This, of course, is exactly the position that Jody Kraus tries to defend, arguing that law 
and economic theory is a kind of behavioralist explanation of contract case outcomes. See Kraus, 
supra note 23, at 689. 
240. Stephen Smith has pointed out that: 
Although the best known answers to the analytic question are prima facie open to both 
utilitarian and rights-based justifications, in practice scholars who defend particular an-
swers to the analytic question also hold that, in the end, there is only one good justifica-
tion (the justification they defend) for the obligation they have identified. 
SMITH, supra note 2, at 49. 
241. See generally Farber, supra note IO (arguing that in the context of commercial law an 
efficiency standard can be derived from an autonomy norm). 
242. Indeed, elsewhere I have offered a traditional law-and-economics analysis in defense of 
the use of legislative history to construe statutes. See Nathan Oman, Statutory Interpretation in 
Econotopia, 25 PACE L. REV. 49, 72-83 (2005). 
243. See Oman, supra note I2, at I504-06 (arguing that an adequate theory of contract must 
incorporate economic arguments). 
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Unfortunately, the Artificial Personality Argument cannot harmonize the 
discordant voices of autonomy and welfare theories of contract. While it 
appears superficially appealing to efficiency theorists, on closer exami-
nation the theories of the corporation that it requires in order to be coher-
ent cannot be reconciled with the methodological individualism of eco-
nomics. Armed with the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation, 
autonomy theorists can deploy arguments developed in other contexts to 
account for firm-to-firm contracts. Obviously, the autonomy arguments 
that I have discussed are deeply controversial and not without their 
weaknesses. However, one need not be a partisan of such approaches to 
appreciate the key insight of this paper: While the injection of the corpo-
ration into contract theory throws up new examples of old problems, it 
does not pose any fundamentally new or unique issues for autonomy 
theories. A new lex mercatoria may indeed hold the promise of reconcil-
ing the competing approaches to contract, but the promise does not lie in 
the fact that autonomy theories can be summarily banished from its do-
main. Rather, the meta-theoretical advantage of a new lex mercatoria 
must lie in its ability to make the principled integration of autonomy and 
welfare theories into a single approach more tractable. 
